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Abstract 
	 This project is a study of  the psychological concept of  Theory of  Mind (ToM), as well as its 
place in life beyond adolescence. Reaching further than the usual studies based on children and their 
development of  ToM, we aim to shed light upon the ways in which ToM manifests itself  in areas of  
adult life.  
	 Theory of  Mind is a term coined in 1978 to describe one’s ability to first understand that 
others have minds separate from our own, and from there the ability to interpret the others’ mental 
states. Much of  the studies done on this theory are based around children and primates and 
subsequently their development of  ToM. In this paper we analyse the related phenomena of  
hindsight bias, mirror neurons, pluralistic ignorance and deontic reasoning. We then move into analyses of  
Machiavellian Intelligence in relation to ToM, cognitive literary studies and philosophy of  mind. 
By integrating those different phenomena and fields of  study into Theory of  Mind we argue 
for an extended conceptualisation and promote further interdisciplinary research.  
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1. Introduction to the Project 
1.1 Dimensions 
The dimensions we have chosen to cover with our project are Subjectivity and Learning and 
Philosophy and Science. There was little discussion as to which dimensions we should use, as the 
aforementioned dimensions embedded themselves naturally in our project from early on.  
From day one, it was a given that Subjectivity and Learning was going to be part of  our 
focus, as this dimension covers psychology. Although we did not want to write a paper about 
developmental psychology or children in general, we knew that we could not avoid at least touching 
upon these areas in order to deliver a nuanced project, making the Subjectivity and Learning 
dimension all the more pertinent.  
As for Philosophy and Science, the inclusion of  this dimension seemed necessary the farther 
we reached in the writing process. When we decided to use Daniel Dennett to provide an alternative 
perspective on minds and their interactions, Philosophy and Science inevitably became a part of  our 
project. By following the reasoning of  Niccolo Machiavelli in order to introduce the Machiavellian 
Intelligence chapter and explain the etymology of  the term, we were also entering the realm of  
philosophy. Science marbled our project throughout, with the example of  the subchapter on mirror 
neurons being reminiscent of  some of  the more neuroscientific angles, which we explored in the 
lectures on qualia during our first semester at RUC in Philosophy and Science.  
1.2 Methodology 
To begin this project we all undertook a reading of  “Theory of  Mind: Self-Reflection and Social 
Understanding” by Astington and Hughes in “The Oxford Handbook of  Developmental 
Psychology Vol 2: Self  and Other” (2013). Immediately the key method for our project was set, 
namely the act of  reading. It was imperative for us to have a concrete understanding of  the 
foundational aspects of  Theory of  Mind before we could move forward. Once we had read and 
understood the content, we would be able to move on to implementing argumentation. By analysing 
the arguments of  authors, we were able to form our own perspectives on the topic in order to 
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construct a personal line of  argumentation; this would come into play when we reached the all-
important writing stage.  
	 From the introductory literature, the Oxford Handbook, we all moved on to read the topical 
cornerstone “Does the chimpanzee have a theory of  mind?” by Premack and Woodruff, thus 
creating a solid platform to begin our exploration of  Theory of  Mind.  
	 We began brainstorming by way of  a mind map to bring together our thoughts and ideas in 
relation to the many areas which could be incorporated into an extended Theory of  Mind. At first 
glance, it seemed that the literature relevant to ToM largely focused on developmental psychology 
and therefore children. Wanting to explore ToM in a way that would be relevant to our own lives as 
adults, we moved beyond many of  the traditional texts in favour of  more niche realms of  ToM in 
the hopes of  creating a project unique and personal. From our own independent research we had 
come up with many possible routes to take and after narrowing down our options we decided on a 
select few to begin exploring. We soon realised that the scope of  this project was much wider than 
anticipated, as every article we read led to two or three more articles that were equally as interesting 
as the last. While keeping this in mind, we allowed ourselves to ‘run wild’ so to speak, and really 
immerse ourselves in every aspect we found intriguing. A benefit of  this type of  reading was that we 
quickly assessed which areas were fruitful and which areas led to dead ends, thus tightening our 
focus naturally. We were forced to read critically, in the sense that every text had to be gauged as to 
its relevance and applicability. This proved easier as the project blossomed, our understanding of  the 
themes increased and our vision for the end product became clearer.  
	 We split into groups of  two in order to read and write about themes we found most 
engaging. Through this method we were able to be most effective, reading a lot of  material in a 
relatively short period of  time. In order to get the ball rolling and keep our fellow workers informed, 
we began writing as soon we saw fit, which was within the first month. It was important for us to 
create a foundation, however rudimentary, to build upon. Even if  it required extensive editing and 
reshaping, we saw it as advantageous to write as much as possible and trim the fat later, rather than 
put off  the writing process until we felt ‘ready’. This meant that we were constantly moving towards 
a finished project according to deadlines, that no important information was lost or forgotten, and a 
vision of  this finished project was constructed from the start.  
	 It quickly became apparent that, by and large, the methodology taught to us in the course 
lecture on interviewing as well as the accompanying interpretation method, would not be applicable 
to our project. However, as stated above, the other methods of  reading and argumentation were 
fundamental to our process. 
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During the more intensive writing stage we decided to make use of  the classical format of  ‘Theory, 
Analysis, Discussion’. Seeing as our project was shaping up to be an exploration of  many different 
themes, including a final discussion seemed beneficial as it could expand and underscore 
argumentation, where a mere conclusion might be too repetitive. We felt that it would be 
advantageous to consolidate the linkage between the many facets of  our research. To a reader 
unfamiliar with the areas explored, seeing connections may not come intuitively; thus a discussion 
was essential. 
	 In our writing of  the project we have incorporated two stylistic devices worth mentioning, as 
these have served as methods for increasing the engagement and understanding of  the reader. The 
first of  these is the use of  ‘fact-boxes’, small enclosed spaces which we have peppered throughout 
the paper, in which we have summarised key concepts as succinctly as possible to compliment the 
more detailed exposition. They can be understood to serve in the way footnotes usually do. The 
second is the use of  the fictional couple George and Jane. We have used the pair as the actors of  
hypothetical scenarios in which we contextualise the theory under discussion at any given point in 
the project. We found this a helpful tool of  explanation, as well as an engaging way to get the reader 
involved in the material without addressing them or referring to an anonymous, invented subject. So 
as not to ‘spoil’ the story of  George and Jane, we will return to discussing this stylistic device and 
project method in the discussion chapter towards the conclusion.  
1.3 Personal Motivation 
“Many of  the words we use, and much of  what we do in the way of  inventing new meanings 
for words, depend crucially on metaphor. In addition, much everyday speech (as opposed to 
written language) is telegraphic in style: sentences remain half  completed, words are omitted 
and the phrase 'You know what I mean ...?' litters conversations. What this points to is the 
fact that the success of  our conversational activities depends crucially on the listener's ability 
to read the speaker's mind and understand what it is he or she intends to say.” (Dunbar, 
2000: 241) 
As social creatures, we spend our days interacting with each other through a series of  unspoken 
social cues and general understandings. Be it the messages hidden within our body language or the 
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flick of  one’s eyes in a specific way, these are ways that we ‘read’ each other that happen without us 
even having to think about it. Theory of  Mind is a part of  this skill set, it being the ability to 
understand that other people have a mind and that it is separate from yours in the sense that they 
may have different beliefs, desires and perspectives. As simple as this concept may seem, it became 
particularly popular, when it was first established that children under the age of  three seem not to 
possess a Theory of  Mind and that autistic individuals are severely lacking a Theory of  Mind. 
There have been many tests made to assess the levels of  ToM in children, predominantly concluding 
that it is a faculty that is honed as we age.  
	 This project focuses on what happens after childhood. Once past the false-belief  tests and the 
reports on autistic individuals, it seems that the information provided on how Theory of  Mind 
works in adulthood is scarce. Our interest stemmed from that lack of  information, and we became 
curious to find out just how far one’s use of  ToM stretched. Is it a skill that must be learned, or just a 
mechanism that we naturally obtain? Can we improve upon it? How do adults use ToM in their 
daily lives, and is it possible for one to have a better ToM than another? These are some of  the 
questions that motivated us to search for and immerse ourselves in anything we could find that 
supported our concept of  an extended Theory of  Mind. From the cognitive-psychological 
foundation via a philosophical exploration through to our own analysis of  popular culture and 
classical literature, we aim to present a well-rounded and articulate report of  the many facets of  
Theory of  Mind.  
"8
House 3.1.1, Group 2 Spring 2015
1.4 Problem Definition & Research Questions 
If  Theory of  Mind is constitutive of  our social selves from early childhood on, what other 
fields of  research can and should be incorporated into an extended ToM to further our 
understanding of  adult social interactions? 
* What insight do other disciplines, such as philosophy and neuroscience, have to offer, and how do 
they complement ToM? 
* To what extent can the disciplines and fields of  research outlined be seen as supplementing one 
another? 
* How does ToM manifest in social (group) settings ? 
* To what degree can one construct a Theory of  Mind in its absence?  
* Is it possible to improve/exercise ToM after it is fully developed? Does a heightened awareness of  
ToM hold practical applications for the individual? 
* How can the terminology and concepts introduced be applied to popular culture? 
"9
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2. Theory 
2.1 Disambiguation 
The theory section of  our paper aims to present both the historical development of  Theory of  
Mind (ToM) and explain the fundamental terminology of  select studies and models introduced in 
the latter half  of  the 20th century. We will create an overview of  ToM, which will serve as a 
supporting structure when we paint a more extensive picture that incorporates topics as far-spread 
as Machiavellian Intelligence, Cognitive Literary Psychology, and a philosophy of  the mind and other closely 
related phenomena. 
The term Theory of  Mind was coined by Premack and Woodruff  in their seminal 1978 
paper “Does the chimpanzee have a theory of  mind?”, though it is worth noting that the concept of  
folk psychology is sometimes used synonymously and predates the concept of  ToM. Also called 
commonsense or naïve psychology, folk psychology will here refer to mindreading and the underlying theory 
(Stanford Encyclopedia of  Philosophy). The notion of  mindreading might, to the uninitiated, 
conjure up images of  telepathy and pseudoscience but in cognitive psychology refers to interpreting 
another person’s mental state. 
Folk psychology is not to be mistaken for a translation of  Lazarus’ concept of  Völkerpsychologie, 
though it was originally used in that sense from the middle of  the 19th century on. A last important 
distinction to make is between ToM and empathy: while the latter is closely related to ToM, inasmuch 
as both terms can be conceptualised as ‘putting oneself  into another’s shoes’, empathy differs in its 
emphasis on emotional perspective taking. While especially cognitive empathy can be seen to be almost 
synonymous with Theory of  Mind, within the research field ToM is the agreed upon term and by 
now carries a clearly neutral and scientific connotation, whereas empathy remains a rather ambiguous 
term, especially because of  its simplified use in everyday language.  
2.2 Historical Development of  the Research Field 
In 1978 the scientific journal Behavioural and Brain Science published a short article called “Does the 
chimpanzee have a theory of  mind?”. In it, American researchers David Premack and Guy 
Woodruff  describe a series of  experiments in which a trained primate was tested on its ability to 
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perform higher-order problem solving. More specifically, they were confronted with problems a 
human actor faced and were made to choose between photographs displaying possible solutions. 
In one example the human actor was shown to be shivering from cold – to alleviate his 
discomfort he might use a paper wick to light a heater in the room. The chimpanzee was then given 
the option to select a photograph showing either an unlit wick, a burnt out one or a burning one. In 
this scenario as well as in others the test subject showed a high enough consistency in choosing a 
correct solution to lead Premack and Woodruff  to conclude that Sarah, the primate, was able to 
infer an individual’s mental state (Premack & Woodruff, 1978: 520). 
This study has been criticised, firstly in its execution for creating an environment too 
artificial to convincingly argue in favour of  chimpanzees possessing ToM in real-life circumstances, 
and secondly in its interpretation for dismissing the possibility of  associationism. In his commentary 
“Belief  about Beliefs”, published alongside Premack and Woodruff ’s paper, Daniel C. Dennett 
proposes that the behaviour exhibited by the chimpanzee might be a result of  stimulus response learning 
(SRL), where one’s expectation of  behaviour is derived from habits or beliefs, from experienced 
regularities in the external world (comp: Dennett, 1978). In narrowly focusing on the existence of  
ToM, Premack and Woodruff  then designed their study to rule out SRL or associationism, which in 
turn impeded simplicity and made the conclusion seem based on complex conditions with little 
room for interpretation beyond the expected outcome.  
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Over the course of ToM research there have been many variations of the 
false-belief task, some of which are more complex; an abstract, simplified 
example is outlined below. 
	 A test subject – in this case a child aged 2 to 9 – observes the 
following scenario: 
	 Person A enters a room with two different containers and places 
an object in container 1. Person A leaves the room and shortly thereafter 
Person B enters (without Person A knowing) and transfers the object to 
container 2. Person B leaves the room. 
	 Person A enters again and now the test subject is asked to predict 
in which container Person A will look for the object. 
	 In order to answer correctly the test subject has to attribute a so-
called false-belief to Person A. The false-belief task then tests whether a 
person can distinguish between his or her own knowledge and another 
person’s belief. Wimmer and Perner describe this as “children’s 
competence in representing another person’s definite belief which differs 
from what the subject knows to be true” (Wimmer & Perner, 1983: 106). 
This competence is seen as a key factor in developing ToM.		 [box1]
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One can argue that precisely these deficiencies led Dennett to devise an outline for further 
research. In “Belief  about Beliefs” he proposed a precursor to what would become known as the 
Sally-Anne test or false-belief task, which marks the focus shifting from primates to humans and 
constitutes the exemplary method most other studies attributing ToM to test subjects are based on. 
	 In 1983 Wimmer and Perner published the first empirical study on false-belief attribution as 
“Beliefs about Beliefs – Representation and constraining function of  wrong beliefs in young 
children’s understanding of  deception”; “Beliefs about Beliefs” here referring to the Dennett 
commentary of  (almost) the same title. Their findings for the first time showed in which age group 
ToM manifests within children. The results suggest that there is a significant leap in cognitive 
development between children from the age of  3 to 4 and children aged 4 to 6 (Wimmer & Perner, 
1983: 114). However, since Wimmer and Perner used several complex storytelling scenarios, the 
methodology applied was still far from the elegant, hands-on simplicity Dennett envisioned 
(Dennett, 1978: 569). 
	 Two years later this concern was addressed by Baron-Cohen et al. in their subsequent study 
"Does the autistic child have a 'theory of  mind'?" – again, pointing towards the original Premack 
and Woodruff  paper. Autistic children tend to be fascinated by mechanics and repetition but are 
curiously uninterested in ‘pretend play’. Since this requires assuming another’s perspective or 
‘putting yourself  into someone else’s shoes’, there was found to be a correlation between autism and 
lack of  mentalising processes (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). 
	 In this task, the method employed in order to test the hypothesis closely resembles the 
abstract outlined in [box2] – to engage the children the protagonists are represented by two dolls, 
Sally and Anne. The test subjects are categorised as being normal, autistic and diagnosed with down’s 
syndrome. To ascertain whether all children exhibit the same base-level of  understanding of  the 
scenario control questions are asked. These were (almost) unanimously answered correctly by 
children across the three groups. However, results differed in a statistically significant way when 
prompted with the decisive false-belief question ‘Where will Sally look for her marble?’  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The following figure serves to illustrate the setup: 
   
Figure 1. Experimental scenario
A large majority of  normal and down’s syndrome children correctly answered the false-belief-question 
(85% and 86% respectively), while only 20% of  the autistic children answered correctly. Baron-
Cohen et al. saw it necessary to invoke ToM here, since solely perceptual, i.e. spatio-visual 
perspective taking does not suffice to make sense of  the scenario. Rather, it seemed that the autistic 
children’s poor performance was due to a deficiency in conceptual perspective-taking skill, which 
denotes the capacity to impute beliefs to others.  
Furthermore, the former two results indicate that intellectual disability as such has no impact 
on a child’s ability to impute second-order mental states, but rather that specifically the 
neurodevelopmental disorder autism is inextricably linked to impaired or lack of  ToM (Goldman, 
2012: 6). We will revisit this phenomenon later on in Chapter 3.3.2. 
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2.3 Theory Theory, Simulation Theory and Modulation Theory 
Over the last decades the conceptualisation of  ToM has taken different forms: the publication of  
Winfried Sellar’s 1956 essay “Empiricism and the Philosophy of  Mind” is regarded by some as a 
precursor to the so-called theory theory approach to mentalising (Goldman, 2012: 2). Wimmer and 
Perner’s aforementioned study falls under this category. Since theory theory is an extension of  the 
original concept of  ToM as defined by Premack and Woodruff, they in retrospect can also be seen to 
have a theory theory approach. After introducing this school of  thought, we will outline simulation theory, 
of  which Goldman has been a proponent. Lastly we will introduce modulation theory, which became a 
popular alternative understanding in the mid-1980s (Goldman, 2012: 5) – Baron-Cohen et al. were 
among the first proponents of  this revised notion. 
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A representational mental state consists of a certain attitude a person 
has towards something (the propositional content) and colours one’s 
action, reaction, interaction or inaction by ascribing subjective value to 
the content. We will now identify two basic types of representational 
mental states, beliefs and desires. The following table makes use of 
terminology introduced by Searle (Searle, 1983: 91). 
Beliefs 	 are 	 	 true / false  
show 		 world-to-mind causation 
(and 	 	 mind-to-world fit if belief (false)) 
Desires	 are	 	 fulfilled / unfulfilled 
	 	 show	 	 mind-to-world causation 
	 	 (and	 	 world-to-mind fit if desire (unfulfilled)) 
Consider this example: George hears water dripping (propositional 
content) and he infers that it is raining. An external factor (Searle’s 
world) convinces him (Searle’s mind) of that fact. If George’s belief that 
it is raining outside proves false upon looking out his window he has to 
adjust (fit) his belief according to the newly realised external 
circumstance – his wife Jane is taking a shower.  
Conversely, if George wants the dripping to stop in order to fulfill his 
desire he will have to turn off the shower, thus manipulating external 
circumstance or in Searle’s terms fitting the world to his mind. 
Amongst others (e.g. emotion, intention) these variables can be used and 
weighted to “explain and predict behaviour” (Astington and Hughes, 
2013: 4), which forms the basis of false-belief tasks.	 	 	 [box2]
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The theory theory (TT) approach presumes that from a certain age on children are capable of  
employing reasoning to come to conclusions about other people’s behaviour. In other words, ToM is 
the result of  applying a quasi-scientific method on real-life observations related to mental states in 
other human agents. In accordance, children are, 
viewed as little scientists who form and revise their thinking about various domains in the 
same way scientists do. They collect evidence, make observations, and change their theories 
in a highly science-like fashion. They generate theories not only about physical phenomena 
but also about unobservable mental states like belief  and desire. As in formal science, 
children make transitions from simple theories of  the phenomena to more complex ones. 
(Goldman, 2012: 3) 
To expand on the “little scientist”-analogy, theory theorists argue that children up to 3 years of  age 
show a “conceptual deficit” in that they lack a representational theory of  belief, meaning that 
conceptions of  beliefs are one-dimensional: children see beliefs as linear, as “simple relations 
between the cognizer and the external world, relations that do not admit the possibility of  
error” (Goldman, 2012: 4). As they mature, children improve their theorising by factoring in that 
beliefs include propositional representations that can be either true or false. Thus, by the age of  four the 
‘scientists’ have created themselves a more sophisticated theory essential to their understanding of  
self  and other, as well as to their competence to comprehend, question and predict others’ actions 
and intentions.  
Also dubbed “empathy theory”, simulation theory (ST) offers a differing explanation to the 
origin and inner workings of  ToM. As the name implies, simulation of  another person’s experience 
is used to make sense of  it and attribute mental states to that person. Rather than accessing a self-
created theory to mentalise, someone implementing ToM would put themselves in another’s 
perspective to understand their emotions, beliefs or desires and thereby anticipate their behaviour.  
The observer tries to produce surrogate mental states of  those perceived in the observant in 
order to simulate possible resulting scenarios. To quote Goldman, 
These initial pretend states are fed into the mindreader’s own cognitive mechanisms to 
generate additional states, some of  which are then imputed to the target. In other words, 
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attributors use their own mind to mimic or “model” the target’s mind and thereby determine 
what has or will transpire in the target. (Goldman, 2012: 10) 
So in order for George to understand why Jane does not want to talk to him when he gets home 
from work he has to ‘feed’ Jane’s perspective into his mind and then ‘run’ a pretend version of  her 
supposed feelings and perceptions. He then realises he should have called Jane to tell her he was 
working after hours.  
Here some people, including Dennett, argue that George would need an underlying theory 
to properly organise the knowledge he has of  Jane to then perform a ‘good’ simulation. ST would 
then only be an extension of  TT based on the same theoretical foundation. But while TT is applied 
abstractly to observed behaviour, in using ST an agent actually simulates a real person’s experience 
and/or action. 
To retain a distinction between the two theories, Goldman proposed a potential convergence 
of  TT and ST to be called theory-driven simulation as opposed to process-driven simulation, which can 
be applied whenever both the “initial states” of  observer and observant and the “mechanism driving 
the simulation” strongly resemble each other, so that no theory is needed to enable the simulation 
(Goldman, 2012: 11). Hence the ease of  application of  ST depends largely on the observer’s 
knowledge of  the observant or ‘similarity’ between observer and observant. In other words, the 
better George knows Jane or the more he resembles her, the more process-driven he can predict her 
behaviour by putting himself  into her shoes. 
As mentioned at the start of  this section, there is a third popular notion of  how ToM 
manifests itself, that of  modulation theory (MT). It differs from TT as follows: 
[W]hereas the child-scientist approach claims that mentalizing utilizes domain-general 
cognitive equipment, the modularity approach posits one or more domain-specific modules, 
which use proprietary representations and computations for the mental domain. (Goldman, 
2012: 5)  
This is to say that children possess a mechanism for ToM that forms but one processing module 
within the vast cognitive landscape of  the brain. Furthermore, this mechanism “as part of  our 
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genetic endowment” is present from birth and gets triggered at certain developmental stages and not 
acquired – “just as puberty is triggered rather than learned” (Goldman, 2012: 6). 
This conception helped Baron-Cohen et al. to explain why autists consistently 
underperformed on mentalising tasks. They concluded ToM takes place in a domain-specific 
cognitive module, “hav[ing] demonstrated a cognitive deficit that is largely independent of  general 
intellectual level and has the potential to explain [...] social impairment by virtue of  a circumscribed 
cognitive failure” (Baron Cohen et al., 1985: 8). 
How independently this ToM module really works is debated, however, since its domain 
specificity is limited when considering that especially the recognition and use of  ‘pretend play’ draws 
on real-world knowledge. “This knowledge would have to be obtained from (another) central 
system” (Goldman, 2012: 7), so that there is necessarily some interdependency of  different modules; 
an isolated look at ToM abilities is likely to disregard other factors in the development of  autism.  
Over the course of  the paper we will try to refrain from this self-referentiality and explore 
how also within the development of  ToM other influences from different fields factor in. 
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Theory theory supposes that to mentalise one employs a quasi-scientific 
method (“little scientist” analogy) to infer another’s mental state as well 
as predict their actions by way of theorising  
→ ToM = applied scientific theory 
Simulation theory points to the mimicry of another’s supposed mental 
state; one assumes another’s stance and mentally plays out a scenario 
suggesting their possible future action; the closer the ‘resemblance’ 
between the observer and observed, the more accurately one can 
predict behaviour based on a process-driven use of ST  
→ ToM = running simulation program 
Modulation theory postulates an innate mechanism for ToM (a domain-
specific cognitive module) that is activated at a certain point in one’s 
development  
	 → ToM = real psychological structure	 	 	 	 	 [box3]
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2.4 Closing Remarks 
Over the last few pages we have introduced important terminology for ToM, a rough timeline of  the 
development of  the research into Theory of  Mind and three common theories aimed at explaining 
the underlying workings of  Theory of  Mind.  
	 As is to be expected with a field this sprawling, the latter three theories do not constitute all 
the ‘trends’ in ToM research: amongst others Dennett approaches the complex from a different 
angle and explores its philosophical dimensions, putting forward his concept of  the intentional stance, 
which we will expand on in the last chapter of  our project.  
	 Furthermore, the reader might have noticed a focus on the cognitive aspects of  ToM, while 
our outline largely ignored the socio-psychological implications so far. This is in part due to the fact 
that most of  the research conducted deals with developmental issues grounded in cognitive 
psychology. The research and theoretical work that have been done to frame ToM within a socio-
psychological context are also more exploratory and encompass a large variety of  topics. This 
naturally makes for a less unified terminology as the different themes do not always share 
commonalities with each other outside of  ToM. To find a way to integrate these themes into a 
‘bigger picture’ of  Theory of  Mind is the main purpose of  this paper. 
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3. Analysis 
Having established the theoretical foundation of  our paper, in our analysis we aim to apply the 
conceptualisations presented to related fields, where an incorporation of  ToM can further our 
insight into the respective topics. We will firstly explore psychological phenomena and concepts 
closely related to ToM research, with the intention to find meaningful links that enhance their 
understanding mutually, adding both a social and a neuropsychological dimension to our thus far 
predominantly cognitive conception of  mentalising. This will then lead into a chapter on 
Machiavellian Intelligence, where we will examine the role of  deception and scheming in our 
interactions with others as well as the relation between manipulative behaviour and the application 
of  Theory of  Mind. In moving beyond the mere utilisation of  ToM, the subsequent chapter will 
shed light on the dynamic nature of  the mentalising process, investigating both a case of  an autist 
consciously constructing ToM in absence of  it and the role of  fiction in stimulating and improving 
our Theory of  Mind. The more theoretical concepts explaining the benefits of  reading fiction will 
then be applied practically in an analysis of  an episode of  Friends that contains interesting examples 
of  mentalising processes. Lastly, in turning to Daniel Dennett’s intentional stance, we shall bolster our 
conception of  mindreading with a perspective from the field of  philosophy of  mind. 
3.1 Related Phenomena and Concepts 
In this chapter we will introduce four psychological concepts that show considerable overlap with 
existing research into Theory of  Mind, and integrate those in a broader understanding of  
mentalistic processes. This is not say that there does not exist a wide variety of  issues of  topical 
importance, and conversely that these four chosen subjects represent the entirety of  relevant 
research field. We will show that they, albeit chosen based on personal interest, lend themselves to 
creating a well-rounded reflection on ToM. 
3.1.1 Deontic Reasoning 
An astute reader will have noticed a bypassing of  the moral and cultural implications of  Theory of  
Mind in this paper so far. Surely an agent’s actions are not only dictated by belief  and desire but are 
subject to external factors such as societal constraints. Recently, and in line with the overall purpose 
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of  our examination of  ToM related phenomena, researchers have called to extend the 
conceptualisation to integrate the deontic reasoning (DR) system in the established mental reasoning 
system usually associated with ToM.  
	 DR is a branch of  symbolic logic concerning itself  with permissions, rules, laws  and 
morality, finding a practical application insofar as those often societal norms govern our actions 
(Stanford Encyclopedia of  Philosophy).  
	 The grounds for this section are Henry M. Wellman and Joan G. Miller’s 2008 paper 
“Including Deontic Reasoning as Fundamental to Theory of  Mind”, who argue in favour of  the 
interdependence of  belief-desire concerns and obligation-permission or deontic concerns, and thus in 
favour of  widening ToM’s scope to illuminate an agent’s actions within society. In other words, they 
oppose the conceptualisation of  naïve psychology being separate to naïve sociology, which concerns itself  
with “group assignments (e.g. kinship, race) that specify a range of  deontological obligations and 
contractual actions” (Atran, 1996: 217 in Wellman & Miller, 2008: 106).  
	 The consideration of  DR in assessing one’s own or another’s mental state (and a resulting 
motivated action) aims to both facilitate comprehension and ground behaviour in a social context; 
“the more artificial the test circumstances, the more restricted the range of  predictions available to 
the theory-of-mind hypothesis” (Dennett, 1978: 569). Incorporating DR, then, can be understood to 
alleviate the artificiality of  test circumstances by considering the societal, normative framework an 
agent acts within. Accordingly, Wellman and Miller see as problematic that, 
the traditional belief-desire framework portrays everyday psychology as an enterprise where 
behavior is conceptualized in freely chosen terms, with little attention given to the extent to 
which behavior is situated in a social-psychological context and may be undertaken in 
response to social rules, obligations, duties, and responsibilities that must inevitably also be at 
play. (Wellman & Miller, 2008: 107) 
If  we accept that behaviour is not merely freely chosen but normatively influenced, how does that 
facilitate our understanding of  everyday situations?  
	 Consider this example: George voluntarily does the dishes after having had breakfast with 
Jane, not just because he prefers (desires) an uncluttered kitchen but because Jane had not had time 
before leaving for work and expects her husband to pull his weight around the household. George's 
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action is thus not exclusively a question of  self-direction but governed by a desire that coincides with 
a norm – this norm “provides ‘force’ to engage in [an] action” (Ibid.: 107).  
	 To continue the physics analogy, a ‘normative force’ can be thought of  as acting in the same 
‘direction’ as a ‘mentalistic force’ and result in a ‘net force’ promoting an action (as in the example 
above), or one might act laterally on the other (George is reluctant to do the dishes but Jane’s 
expectation prompts him to clean one plate and two forks anyway) and inflect an action, or they 
might act in opposite directions and cancel each other out (an unwilling George is perpetually 
trapped in uncertainty and found standing motionless in front of  the sink when Jane returns from 
work). In any case, Wellman and Miller argue the following: 
(a) theory of  mind is fundamental to deontic reasoning; (b) conversely, deontic concerns are 
integral to theory of  mind […] Key to both (a) and (b) is the claim that deontic knowledge is 
(conceptually, for adults) inherently mentalistic. (Ibid.: 109) 
It is important to note that, while ToM is unanimously accepted as universal, a normative 
framework is inherently culturally and societally contingent. DR can account for this variability 
where a more stringent model of  ToM ignores it. This can be thought of  as a result of  the emphasis 
placed on persons as independent individuals in the “European-American [EA] folk psychology of  
individual agency” (Ibid.: 108). Angeline Lillard aims to shed light on this issue in her 1998 paper 
“Ethnopsychologies: Cultural Variations in Theory of  Mind”:  
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Beliefs/desires are modulated by obligations/permissions 
Obligation socially constricts action of an agent (who may or may not 
choose to resist an expected course of action depending on e.g. desire) 
	 → lifting an obligation allows the agent to choose freely to do or 	
	 not to do something 
Permission socially facilitates action of an agent (who may or may not 	
choose to engage in an expected course of action depending on e.g. 
desire) 
	 → rescinding a permission results in a constraint	 	 [box4]
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In EA culture, people are usually considered responsible for their own behavior but not for 
that of  others […] In contrast, in Japan, even preschoolers are considered responsible for the 
actions of  their classmates (Lewis, 1995). Notably, there is some movement away from the 
individual responsibility orientation of  the EA, for example, in court cases in which it is 
argued that one's behaviour results from how one's parents treated one as a child. This 
within-culture variability deserves more systematic study. To the extent that it exists, it 
reinforces the point that the construal is optional. (Lillard, 1998: 5) 
Lillard’s remark is legitimised to some extent by Wellman and Miller citing several studies to have 
shown that even in US culture almost three quarters of  everyday behavioural attributions do not 
refer to social context (Wellman & Miller, 2008: 108).  
As deontic concerns are culturally variable and overlap mentalistic considerations, 
integrating DR and ToM makes for a more flexible framework that can readily account for issues 
not usually addressed in existing cognitive-psychological research. The concept of  duty, for example, 
is one closely linked to obligations but emphasises morality and social responsibility. The quote 
below serves to highlight the overlap between desire and obligation in non-EA cultures:  
Cross-cultural work also reveals that in Hindu and Buddhist cultures, duty is linked to self-
identity and to self-benefit, at least in part, through metaphysical beliefs such as karma, and 
through a view of  dharma as simultaneously a natural, social, and spiritual code for conduct 
[...] Research among Japanese cultural populations, in turn, highlights a contrasting view of  
duty, and of  its implications for self, one that gives greater weight to being a good group 
member [...] For example, Japanese people draw a distinction between honne and tatemae, that 
is, between one’s ‘real’ feelings and feelings that must be socially expressed or inhibited in the 
service of  maintaining harmonious relationships. (Ibid.: 128) 
Surely, when George has a business meeting with Takeshi – a representative of  a Japanese 
advertising agency – to present his idea for a joint international campaign, he would benefit from 
knowing that his colleague might refrain from expressing his true (negative) opinion, his honne about 
George’s proposal. In saving ‘face’ Takeshi inevitably undermines a fruitful working process, which 
leads to the eventual cancellation of  the campaign; accounting for cultural variability when 
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interpreting Takeshi’s mental state might have secured George the promotion he wishes for. He 
really could have used the money.  
	 Whether in intercultural or more generally in social interactions of  any kind, deontic reasoning 
influences our behaviour substantially, both legitimising and constricting our actions. Cultural 
variability is not usually accounted for in the predominant conception of  Theory of  Mind and here 
the inclusion of  deontic concerns into the mentalising process can fill contextual gaps to provide 
valuable insight. 
3.1.2 Mirror neurons 
Mirror neurons (MN) were first described in 1996 by an Italian research team from University of  
Parma, Italy, including Giacomo Rizzolatti and Vittorio Gallese. In a paper published four years 
earlier in the Experimental Brain Research Journal, the researchers had discovered, seemingly by 
accident, that neurons in the ventral premotor cortex (the F5 region) of  the brain in macaques 
discharged not only when a macaque subject was performing manipulative motor functions such as 
handling food or objects but also when the monkeys observed researchers performing the same 
actions. The actions were defined as goal-directed hand movements, for example grasping, holding 
and tearing (Di Pellegrino et al., 1992: 176). In the final sentence of  the paper, the authors note that 
the F5 brain region in macaques “[...] corresponds in large part to the Broca’s area in the human 
brain [...]” (Ibid.: 179). This would be part of  their focus in their next paper “Premotor cortex and 
the recognition of  motor actions” (1996), in which the term “mirror neurons” would be coined and 
the phenomenon further investigated both in non-human and human primates. 
A particular point of  interest in the research of  Rizzolatti et al. was that during the firing of  
mirror neurons resulting in the macaques’ observation of  the manipulation of  3D objects, no physical 
movement from the macaques was detected (Rizzolatti et al., 1996: 131). In addition, no firing of  
mirror neurons was detected when similar hand movements were made without an object (Ibid.: 135). 
The correlation between the actions of  another, in this case the experimenter, and the same actions 
of  the subject, was confirmed through rigorous experimentation and observation. It was also 
discovered that it was only in acts that could be replicated by the macaques that mirror neurons were 
discharged. This highlights that in some way the macaques were ‘putting themselves in the shoes’ of  
the experimenters, momentarily acting vicariously through those they observed handling desirable 
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objects such as food. Meanwhile variables could also be discounted which threatened the hypothesis 
of  the researchers that mirror neurons were being fired, and this was due to the monkeys simulating 
themselves in the favourable position of  the observer or seeing a connection between the observers 
and themselves: 
The specificity of  most mirror neurons and the congruence observed in many of  them 
between the observed and executed effective actions, renders very unlikely that their 
activation during gesture observation was due to monkey-experimenter interactions related 
to unspecific factors such as food expectancy, motor preparation for food retrieval or reward.  
[...] the discharge of  mirror neurons caused by the observation of  a movement is not 
followed by the movement that, supposedly, was prepared. The monkey looking at another 
monkey that grasps food does not move subsequently his fingers. Secondly, and most 
importantly, mirror neurons cease firing when the food is moved toward the animal and 
becomes available to him. If  the firing of  mirror neurons were related to motor preparation, 
the neuron activity should have increased and not decreased in the phase that precedes 
movement execution. (Ibid.:135-137) 
It is important to notice that the neurological response observed here is connected not just to any 
movements or muscular contractions but to motor movements specifically. Gallese and Goldman 
stress that "what makes a movement into a motor act is the presence of  a goal" (Gallese & Goldman, 
1998: 493), which suggests some, however primitive, form of  intentionality. Therefore the hypothesis 
may be drawn that neurons reacting to the movement of  another subject ‘recognise’ the intention 
behind the movement, which can be seen as predicting another subject's behaviour based on their 
mental state. And this is only a step away from folk psychology. 
A study conducted by Fadiga et al. (1995, in Ibid.) on human cerebral motor cortex shows 
similar results to the earlier experiments with monkey subjects. The scientists presumed that if  
humans have mirror neurons and if  they function analogously to the neurons of  the F5 region in 
monkeys, then while a motor action is being observed by the subject, the cerebral motor cortex 
should induce neuroelectrical impulses in the muscles under Transcranic Magnetic Stimulation. An 
interesting result was observed, namely,  
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the increase of  excitability was present only in those muscles that subjects would use when 
actively performing the observed movements. This study provided for the first time evidence 
that humans have a mirror system similar to that in monkeys. Every time we are looking at 
someone performing an action, the same motor circuits that are recruited when we ourselves 
perform that action are concurrently activated. (Ibid.: 495) 
Why is the presence of  MN in the human brain so important? In their article "Mirror neurons and 
the simulation theory of  mind-reading" (1998), Gallese and Goldman argue for the importance of  
neurological brain responses as an evidence in favour of  simulation theory. As we have outlined in the 
theory chapter, ST proposes one possible explanation of  the processes that allow humans to predict 
other's intentions and actions, and it is made possible by imitating other persons’ mental states and, 
again, 'putting oneself  in their shoes'. Mimicking mental events of  another, according to Gallese and 
Goldman, is not merely an abstract mental process but it is reflected in the physical brain structure, 
namely the aforementioned Broca’s area in the frontal lobe, more specifically the premotor cortex. 
Broca’s region is primarily responsible for speech and language production (Ibid.: 495).  
How can neurological processes in the brain explain ST? In ST one assumes the mental state 
of  another, simulating the other’s behaviour in one’s mind. This process works also in retrospect: 
knowing the behaviour of  another person, one can deduce the mental events that led to this 
outcome by asking oneself  “If  I did this or that instead of  the other person, what mental states 
could have possibly caused it?”. Gallese and Goldman hypothesise that the same mechanism takes 
place on the neurological level – on observing an action performed by Jane, such as grabbing a 
pickle, George’s brain processes the information of  what action is being performed (outcome) to 
deduce which muscles must have been activated in order to pick up the pickle (in other words, which 
neurological process had to take place). MN simulate the processes that led to the motor action (Jane 
grabbing the pickle) by sending impulses to corresponding muscles in the observer’s (George’s) body, 
impulses which are externally invisible. “Thus MN activity seems to be nature’s way of  getting the 
observer into the same ‘mental shoes’ as the target [...]”, which is precisely what our minds do 
according to ST (Ibid.: 497). 
To return to Rizzolatti et al. in “Premotor cortex and the recognition of  motor 
actions” (1996), the researchers make conclusions about Broca’s region and its function in terms of  
mirror neurons and language. They suggest that human language may have developed from the initial 
function of mirror neurons facilitating an understand of  meaning and intention in physical gestures 
and movements - primate communication in its most basic and primitive form. The ability to 
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understand the implications of  motor acts, “[...] evolved possibly in relation with the development 
of  a more complex social life, first the capacity to make and interpret facial communicative gestures, 
and, then the capacity to emit and understand ‘verbal gestures’” (Rizzolatti et al., 1996:139).  
It would make sense, according to this hypothesis, that this developed ability to understand 
intentionality behind motor acts can be seen not just as the precursor to understanding body 
language and later vocal language, but also a stepping stone in the development of  ToM in primates 
and related phenomena such as Machiavellian Intelligence, the topic of  a later chapter in this paper. 
If  minds can intuitively decipher intentionality and meaning behind simple bodily movements, then 
they must have an according, intuitive understanding that another mind is behind these movements 
- the vessel of  intentionality.  
The book “On Being Moved: From Mirror neurons to Empathy” by Stein Bråten considers 
the possible origins of  and explanations for empathy. Bråten states, 
We know from mirror-neuron studies that monkeys not only make the actions of  others their 
own [...] but do the same for chains of  actions and their predicted outcomes. In other words, 
the intentions of  others instead of  being cognitively understood, seem to be automatically 
encoded from observed motor sequences [...]. When reading one another, monkeys thus 
adopt an “intentional stance” (cf. Dennett 1987). (Bråten, 2007: 62) 
What can be extrapolated from Bråten’s statement, is that MN explain intentions and with them 
ToM on a neuroscientific level, and that little cognition actually takes place in understanding the 
desire, intention and possibly belief, but what is in fact taking place is a reflexive reaction to the 
firing of  MN in the F5 (monkeys) or Broca’s (humans) brain region.  
It may thus be suggested that mirror neurons serve an evolutionary purpose, as being able to 
automatically realise the intentions or desires of  another renders higher one’s chances of  satisfying 
one’s own intentions or desires. In addition, it may help to protect oneself  against the implications 
of  the satisfaction of  another’s desire. It also holds an evolutionary benefit by facilitating social 
cohesion (“social facilitation”), as Bråten adds,  
This predisposition to be in tune with others and their intentions has high survival value for 
group-living animals, which need to synchronize activities. Imagine a group in which every 
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individual would eat and sleep and play at different times: group coordination would be 
impossible. (Bråten, 2007: 62) 
If  one is to accept the inferences laid out in the preceding paragraph, then one can see two obvious 
possibilities for the implications of  MN in regards to ToM. The first is that MN provide a 
neuroscientific explanation for ToM, as discussed above. The second is that, contrary to the 
conclusions reached by Gallese and Goldman, mirror neurons actually undermine ToM by making 
redundant the cognitive psychological foundation. To return to the work of  Bråten in expanding on 
this point, “[...] Hoffman (1981:79) rightly noted that ‘humans must be equipped biologically to 
function effectively in many social situations without undue reliance on cognitive processes.’ It could 
not be otherwise” (Ibid.: 64). 
	 However one chooses to view the relationship between ToM and MN, it is clear that a 
connection exists between the two phenomena, whether they are taken to be complementary or 
mutually exclusive. In any case, mirror neurons serve as “[...] neural mechanisms that may underpin 
our capacity to capture others’ living experiences just by watching them [...]” (Ibid.: 7). 
We conclude that the hypothesis of  an automatic, reflexive mechanism for understanding 
other minds and their intentions does not necessarily contradict ToM in regards to mentalising, even 
if  it raises questions about the cognitive side of  this process. As discussed earlier, Gallese and 
Goldman suggest that MN validate the fundamentals of  simulation theory. If  their conclusions are 
true, it creates a solid argument for physicalism (which we will expand on in the last chapter), and 
associates the mind and all mental events with the physical brain and its functions. Gallese and 
Ferrari, use the term “embodied simulation” to describe the function of  mirror neurons as part of  
automatic unconscious mental mechanism. The pair also state that, “[by] means of  embodied 
simulation, we are intentionally attuned to others” (Ferrari & Gallese in Bråten, 2007: 74). 
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To encapsulate the modus operandi of  mirror neurons as constructed through the various texts 
referred to in this subchapter, the key points are given in the box below. 
3.1.3 Hindsight Bias 
A universally occurring phenomenon, hindsight bias describes the difficulty that we as individuals face 
in disregarding our current state of  knowledge when trying to assess our own past beliefs or those 
currently held by an uninformed other. In the words of  Daniel M. Bernstein et al., “[Hindsight bias] 
occurs when outcome knowledge influences the judgments we make for a naïve other or a naïve 
‘prior’ self. […] In hindsight bias one’s present knowledge influences one’s recollection of  previous 
beliefs” (Bernstein et al., 2007: Abstract, Par. 2). 
	 In order to correctly reproduce or predict the beliefs held by an uninformed past self  or 
present other, we have to suspend facts known to be true and assume the often flawed and uncertain 
beliefs that preceded our knowledge. In failing to do so we exhibit hindsight bias, often accompanied 
with a feeling of  ‘I knew it all along’. For example, when Jane sees George’s bank statement and 
finds out that he is in financial troubles, she feels like she knew it all along, even though up until a 
minute ago she had no idea. But looking back she can of  course notice all the signs indicating 
George harbouring a secret, making it a fact that, in light of  her current knowledge, seems 
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Mirror neurons are located in Broca’s region in the human brain. They 
fire when an individual observes another perform an action which the 
observing individual is able to replicate themselves.  
Person A performs action → Person B observes action → mirror neurons 
fire in Broca’s region within Person B’s brain 	 	 	 	 	  
→  imperceptible neuroelectrical impulses are sent to the to the 
appropriate muscles in Person B’s body →  “Embodied Simulation” has 
occurred. 
This may explain why George salivates when he sees Jane eating a 
pickle. Mirror neurons begin to fire when he sees Jane perform the 
action, which automatically lead to him adopting the mental state of 
Jane. Once he reaches this mental state, he reacts physically as if it were 
he who was eating the pickle.	 	 	 	 	 	 [box5]
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inevitable. Whether in relationships, sports events or court proceedings, hindsight bias is an extremely 
common phenomenon and shown to be immune to a variety of  factors: 
Hindsight bias is robust, occurring across a wide range of  time intervals (from minutes to 
years) between the initial judgment, the outcome information, and the second judgment. 
The bias even occurs after participants are explicitly warned to avoid it. 	 	 	
(Ibid.: Abstract, Par. 6) 
In everyday life, hindsight bias occurs most commonly when looking at the unfolding of  past events. A 
person might claim to have ‘known it all along’ that the left-wing party was going to receive a 
crushing defeat at the latest election, when in reality there was little to no indication for this result 
beforehand. The knowledge we currently possess tints our perception of  the past and makes difficult 
a realistic assessment of  the likelihood for things to have happened or be as they turned out. In the 
words of  Daniel M. Bernstein, “people who have knowledge of  an outcome overestimate the 
likelihood of  that outcome. Hindsight bias provides the illusion of  understanding the past, and can 
result in a failure to learn from the past” (Bernstein et al., 2012: Abstract, Par. 4). This is a 
widespread fallacy, often displayed in retrospective blame directed at those responsible, such as 
coaches or politicians, who are accused to have reacted inadequately in the face of  a challenge, 
when the situation might have been much less straightforward than it appears in hindsight. The 
latter by no means implies that criticism of  past actions is by default misguided; rather, it is meant to 
show that the perceived inevitability of  the known outcome often paints a one-dimensional picture 
of  the past. 
	 Scientifically, there are two experimental designs to test for hindsight bias: the hypothetical and 
the memory design. The former provides the test subject with an answer to a challenging question, for 
example that mosquitoes have 47 teeth (Bernstein et al., 2012: Appendix, Question 13). When asked 
to estimate what a naïve other would answer, research has shown that the test subject will presume 
the other to come very close to the right answer and say for example “40”. In reality, however, a 
naïve person would rarely come close to the actual number and might have said anything from 
“none” to “100”. By contrast, using memory design, the test subject would be made to answer the 
question themselves (saying for example “28”), then confronted with the actual answer, and lastly 
made to recall what their original answer had been. In light of  the correct answer test subjects are 
shown to “[...] distort their memory of  their own past judgment and gravitate toward their current 
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knowledge” (Bernstein et al., 2007: Abstract, Par. 6), claiming their answer to maybe have been 
“38”. 
The cognitive processes involved in hindsight bias resemble in significant ways those 
happening when using ToM, in that “both involve perspective taking and the misattribution of  
knowledge to the past self  or a current other” (Ibid.: Abstract, Par. 3). There is a difference in 
determining a false belief that misrepresents reality as opposed to recapitulating a previous erroneous 
judgment in the face of  new knowledge, since the former false belief  is based on a cognitive 
perspective error whereas the latter might be more suitably called a wrong assumption about reality 
that is based on a lack of  knowledge or insight. Still, the underlying requirement is to suspend 
currently held knowledge in order to accurately describe a different, less accurate perception of  
reality. Running counterintuitively to our striving for correct representations of  reality (Ibid.: 
Abstract, Par. 11), the common challenge then is to overrule this tendency. 
This becomes more apparent when looking at another false-belief  task that more closely 
resembles the hindsight bias tests: the unexpected-content test. Here, in parallel to the memory design, a 
test subject is made to recall the original wrong answer. Presented with a receptacle that strongly 
suggests to contain a specific content, for instance a Smarties box, the participant finds out that in 
reality the box contains candles. When asked to predict what another person would think that the 
box contains, the right answer involves an awareness of  one’s own previous assumption for the box 
to contain smarties and then to attribute the same belief  to the uninformed other. In other words, 
the right answer equals the wrong representation of  reality – the classic false belief (compare 
Astington & Hughes, 2013: 11). Echoing the findings of  the Sally-Anne test, results show 3-year-olds 
to answer incorrectly and assume another person to answer candles, while 4-to-5-year-olds manage 
to employ Theory of  Mind and answer correctly. 
As with other ToM applications, the ability to do well on this test stays with us from then on; 
once developed, our Theory of  Mind performs reliably throughout our lives. Nonetheless, we are 
unable to eliminate hindsight bias, which remains a discernible factor in our reasoning, as proven by 
Bernstein et al. in their study across all ages, examining hindsight bias in people from 3 to 95 years. 
What they found is that: 
[...] hindsight bias persists throughout life and follows a U-shaped function. The bias 
develops by age three, tends to decline by age five, then stabilizes but remains present in 
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older children and younger adults before increasing in old age. (Bernstein et al., 2012: 
Discussion, Par. 2) 
The increase in hindsight bias in later years is shown to be an age-related phenomenon that can be 
attributed to deteriorating memory, since the false recollection of  a previously held belief  happens 
due to a reconstructive error. In forgetting their original prediction older test subjects show an 
increase in quantitative error-making; kids, however, display hindsight bias caused by a qualitative 
error, mistaking the outcome information for their original prediction (Bernstein et al., 2012: 
Discussion, Par. 1). It is therefore necessary to find an explanation as to why, firstly, qualitative errors 
are only made up until around 5 years of  age and, secondly, hindsight bias still remains a constant 
factor all throughout life. As it turns out, an incorporation of  ToM offers possible answers to both of  
these questions. 
In understanding why young children are the only age group committing qualitative errors, 
the key factor seems to be their application of  a Theory of  Mind. Before understanding that people, 
including themselves, can hold false beliefs, it would be impossible for children to recollect their own 
misrepresentation of  reality as previously held. As Bernstein et al. put it, 
	  
[…] when a preschooler without a mature ToM learns that an alligator has 76 teeth, she is 
likely to think that she always knew that fact, because she finds it impossible to understand 
that she once held a 'false belief' [...]. When an adult with a mature ToM learns this new 
fact, she is likely to think that she always knew that alligators had something close to, but not 
exactly, 76 teeth. The adult can grasp that she may have once held a false belief  (or was in 
ignorance), but the new factual information now colors her judgment of  what she once 
knew. (Bernstein et al., 2012: Discussion, Par. 8) 
Thus our mastering of  ToM enables us to lessen hindsight bias; however, some distortion of  facts as 
they previously were always remains. This can be explained by looking at the quality of  the beliefs 
we hold when exhibiting hindsight bias, especially compared to that of  beliefs involved in using our 
Theory of  Mind. There are two aspects that differ from one to the other: the certainty with which 
we hold our belief  and the amount of  options at our disposal. With regards to the former, Bernstein 
et al. assess, 
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[…] an individual’s initial knowledge state in a hindsight task is more like a hunch or a guess, 
rather than a well-grounded belief. Stated another way, in hindsight tasks the participant’s 
first report is a judgment with relatively low subjective confidence. In contrast, in classic false 
belief  tasks, the participant is asked to recall a prior belief  that was held with great certainty. 
(Bernstein et al., 2007: General Discussion, Par. 4 & 5) 
When asked about the amount of  teeth a mosquito has, for most of  us our answer will be given with 
little certainty with regards to its accuracy. Consequently, we will overrule our initial “hunch” about 
the mosquito’s dental structure quite easily, since we did not hold our initial belief  with great 
confidence to begin with. On the other hand, when asked about the content of  a Smarties box, we 
will assert with rather high certainty that it will contain smarties. We are less likely to overwrite the 
fact that we believed the Smarties box to contain Smarties, even after finding out that it contained 
candles all along. After all, we were quite certain and had good reason to believe the contents to be 
what we thought they were. Updating our beliefs will then be difficult or easy according to how 
firmly we hold these beliefs. 
One reason why hindsight bias may persist throughout life is that information that we hold 
with low certainty is highly malleable and profoundly influenced by new information about 
reality. [...] the fact that we hold an idea with a “low certainty tag” may allow or invite easy 
updating based on feedback, which, in turn, may contribute both to avid learning (which is 
good) and also the “I knew it all along” effect (which is a consequent cognitive ‘bug’). With 
respect to ToM, the fact that we hold an idea with a “high certainty tag” may prevent easy 
updating based on feedback, thereby reducing interference and helping adults, at least, to 
gain full access to past beliefs. This combination of  factors may be why older children and 
adults can access strongly held past beliefs that are contradicted by the current reality 
(success on false belief  tasks) while still doing poorly on hindsight tasks. (Bernstein et al., 
2007: General Discussion, Par. 7) 
Closely related to this reason is the fact that in hindsight bias tasks one could give many different 
answers to the questions posed - for example, to the question of  how many teeth a mosquito has, 
one has a wide range of  numbers to pick from for giving an answer. Accordingly, in retrospect the 
guess can be adjusted much more easily, since one will simply give a number that is closer to, but not 
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exactly the same as, the right answer. By contrast, in false belief  tasks there are only a very limited 
number of  possible answers, and in the ones we have discussed in the theory chapter, precisely two. 
It will be impossible to subtly correct one’s original answer, in saying for instance that one said 
earlier that the smarties box contained both candles and smarties. Either the answer will be 
completely right (“I thought there were smarties in this box”) or completely wrong (“I thought there 
were candles in this box”), so that the mind has less leeway to update the knowledge without us 
noticing. 
Hindsight bias thus occurs mostly when expressing beliefs of  little certainty concerning answers that 
by way of  design can be easily adjusted. Of  course not every guess that is expressed is of  
quantitative nature, as is the case with the earlier example regarding the election results. What 
remains true in any case of  hindsight bias is that the overwriting process takes place more easily the 
less certain or confident the original belief  was held. As Bernstein et al. mention in the above quote, 
this phenomenon is by no means purely negative. For in many situations it is highly advantageous to 
update information easily and improve the knowledge we have, since it saves us time by not 
unnecessarily sticking to apparently wrong beliefs and allows us to quickly incorporate the newly 
obtained knowledge in our perspective of  things. In other words, 
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Hindsight Bias tasks: 
Answer describes (1) little known quantitative fact or (2) ambiguous real-
life event	  
	 →     	wide range of answers, not limited by design 
	 → 	 degrees of right and wrong, i.e. space for adjustment 
Answer is hunch / intuitive guess		  
	 → 	 low certainty, i.e. easily updated 
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –  
False-Belief tasks: 
Answer describes situationally fixed fact 	  
	 → 	 narrow range of answers (typically 2), limited by design 
	 → 	 either right or wrong, i.e. no space for adjustment 
Answer is well-grounded belief 	 	 	  
	 → 	 high certainty, i.e. easily recalled	 	 	 [box6]
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[...] hindsight bias is an unintended by-product of  an otherwise adaptive process for selecting 
and processing information as we try to make sense of  the events that we experience. This 
process is so efficient that it often prevents us from reconstructing the causal and temporal 
chain of  events leading to a particular outcome, rendering the outcome inevitable or more 
likely […]. (Bernstein et al., 2012: Discussion, Par. 14) 
With this in mind, it seems rather logical that hindsight bias would persist throughout our lives. It is 
the unavoidable downside of  an otherwise valuable cognitive tool of  adaptation that helps us to stick 
with newly presented, more convincing knowledge – an ability that is at the core of  character traits 
such as open-mindedness and learning aptitude. The drawback of  hindsight bias comes in when the 
originally held belief  is overwritten to an extent that it does not become retrievable. In resisting this 
process, ToM is an important cognitive ability that allows us to understand that we once held a false 
belief, thus helping us to lessen and control hindsight bias. Our Theory of  Mind can hence be seen as 
the corrective force, constantly keeping us aware that while we might unconsciously adjust our 
original beliefs, these were never identical with the newly obtained facts. In light of  the positive 
effects of  the underlying cognitive processes facilitating hindsight bias, as described above, it might not 
be so worrisome after all, “[...] that we may improve our ability to ignore privileged information for 
the majority of  our lives, but we never perfect this ability” (Bernstein et al., 2012: Discussion, Par. 
14). 
3.1.4 Pluralistic Ignorance 
The term pluralistic ignorance (PI) originates from the social and behavioural sciences dating back to 
the works of  Floyd H. Allport and Daniel Katz in 1931 and has proven to be a widespread 
phenomenon (Van Boven, 2000: 268). 
PI is manifested in situations in which an individual’s public display of  opinion is the same as 
that of  others, while they believe that their private feelings, thoughts, and behaviours differ from 
those of  others (the perceived norm), when in actuality they are not (Synnott, 2012: 95). In other 
words, everyone thinks that everyone else believes, but no one actually believes. This typically occurs 
when members of  the group individually hold false beliefs about the other members’ beliefs and 
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because of  not wanting to sound ill-informed or be embarrassed, they act as if  they also know what 
is going on. The problem is then based on an erroneous use of  ToM, where wrong beliefs are 
attributed to others, thus performing a sort of  ‘mind-misreading’. An oversimplification of  the 
mentalising process is more likely to happen in larger groups because the anonymity of  the situation 
makes one look at the others as one collective mind. 
PI commonly manifests in classrooms full of  students, when a teacher asks if  everyone 
understood the question. In this case students usually do not want to ‘stick their necks out’ but 
rather prefer to remain silent, implying that they understand it, when in reality they do not. 
A model example of  this situation is orchestrated by Dan Ariely, a professor of  psychology 
and behavioural economics at Duke University, who begins one of  his lectures by reading out loud 
to the class, what, unbeknown to the students, is a sequence of  randomly generated words compiled 
by a post-modern literature engine. Although no one understands what the lecturer is talking about, 
and the content that is being read seems rather out of  context and nonsensical, none of  the students 
stop the lecturer to ask for an explanation. After several minutes, professor Ariely reveals that this 
was just an experiment to demonstrate how PI works in practice. Because to the individual student 
everyone else appeared as if  they understood what was being said, each student thought they must 
be the only one not able to follow the class and therefore continues listening as if  they 
comprehended. PI can be thought of  to be caused by self-referential inaction, where refraining from 
speaking up perpetuates the circular nature of  the problem. Since everyone infers mental states from 
others’ behaviour, the students construe a reason for each other not to act up, which then leads to 
the flawed use of  ToM. ‘Flawed use’ here refers not to the mentalising process itself  but to drawing 
the wrong conclusions from the process. Ariely then points out how none of  the students would 
hesitate to interrupt and ask for clarification if  they were to hear the same sentences in a private 
conversation with him (Ariely, 2011). 
Wide research has also been conducted on the presence of  PI in campus alcohol 
consumption. Although a majority of  students endorsed more moderate drinking practices, they 
believed most other students favoured excessive drinking. Schroeder and Prentice (1998) argue that 
it is social processes such as peer influence that play a powerful role in promoting drinking among 
college students (Schroeder & Prentice, 1998: 2151). There are undoubtedly other factors that can 
also be seen to promote drinking. For example, it could be argued that drinking is associated with 
ease of  intimacy and facilitating communication with other students, which further bolsters the 
reason for alcohol consumption. Accordingly, the majority of  students believe their peers to be more 
comfortable with alcohol consumption than they are themselves (Schroeder & Prentice, 1998: 2152). 
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These perceived drinking habits sway individual students into thinking that they should also drink 
more in order to maintain their social identity on campus. 
Although this phenomenon is widespread, as research shows, students seem to overestimate 
their peers’ support for the universality of  the drinking norm (Ibid.: 2152). To demonstrate this 
misconception, Schroeder and Prentice reported a study in their paper: 
Entering students were randomly assigned to participate in one of  two types of  discussions 
about alcohol use during their first week on campus. In the peer-oriented condition, students 
were introduced to the data showing systematic misperception of  other student’s comfort 
with campus drinking practices, [in other words, were made aware of  pluralistic ignorance] 
[...]. In the individual-oriented condition, students participated in a discussion of  how to 
make responsible personal decisions in a drinking situation. This latter condition served as a 
control, from which to evaluate the effects of  the peer-oriented discussion; [...] Four to 6 
months after the discussions, all students completed self-report measures of  their alcohol 
consumption […]. 
	 Students who were not informed about pluralistic ignorance showed strong evidence 
of  social influences on their alcohol use [...]. Students who were informed about pluralistic 
ignorance showed no such pattern: Their sensitivity to social pressure did not moderate the 
relation between perceptions of  the average student and drinking behavior. (Ibid.: 2155-69) 
To paraphrase, beliefs about alcohol use on campus are characterised by students falling prey to PI: 
they assume that their own private attitudes are more conservative than those of  other students 
(Ibid.: 2152). But how do people end up believing such false beliefs in the first place? What makes 
people accept social norms? 
In their paper “Pluralistic Ignorance and Alcohol Use on Campus: Some Consequences of  
Misperceiving the Social Norm” Prentice and Miller (1993) address the matter of  how people 
identify social norms and find: 
First, social norms are defined by people’s public behavior. [...] In addition to their public 
nature, norms are imbued with an impression of  universality: People assume that all 
members of  a group endorse that group’s social norms (Allport, 1924), and, in turn, the 
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power of  norms to affect an individual’s attitudes and behavior is heavily dependent on their 
perceived universality. 
	 As consensus (or the appearance of  consensus) breaks down, the norm loses its 
influence. The Asch (1951) studies provide clear evidence of  the importance of  universality: 
When just one confederate [as in one subject] deviated from the normative response (even by 
giving an alternative wrong answer), conformity dropped to nearly zero. (Prentice & Miller, 
1993: 243-4) 
This could easily be linked to the classroom/lecture situation: there is an unspoken consensus on the 
universality of  the norm, everyone conforms to others’ behaviour for the sake of  maintaining social 
cohesion, and as soon as one of  the members of  the group deviates from the norm, i.e. asks a 
question, the rest of  the class is likely to follow and consequently reveal their actual position. The 
paragraphs quoted above also demonstrate how easy it is to dispel PI. 
To summarise, PI largely occurs in social contexts on a group level, where a certain social 
norm dictates an individual person’s behaviour. By having false beliefs about their peers, and 
consequently inferring incorrect mental states, individuals end up mirroring each others’ perceived 
compliance subconsciously. Pluralistic ignorance is widespread but possible to be actively opposed if  
subjects are made aware of  its existence. 
The notion of  group influence leads us to the next chapter, outlining a theory that 
historically was based on a political thought and had to deal with influence on people. 
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3.2 Machiavellian Intelligence 
Everyone sees what you appear to be, few experience what you really are. (Machiavelli, 1961: 101) 
3.2.1 Prehistory of  the Term 
Nicollò Machiavelli's “The Prince” is a classic of  political philosophy. It was first published in the 
early 16th century, as a sort of  'leader's handbook' for politics, but has since been appreciated as 
having a broader influence, extending beyond its original purpose. The work is famous for such 
maxims as, “[...] it is far better to be feared than loved if  you cannot be both” (Machiavelli, 1961: 
96). 
Amongst other traits, the work advocates a systematic duplicity, a cunning which 
“princes” (Machiavelli's term for leaders) should adopt if  they are to be successful in achieving, 
consolidating and maintaining their power. To summarise, in order to rise to and remain at the top, 
politicians must be willing to deceive opponents, to lie, to take advantage of  situations and to 
manipulate them to their favour. Whilst being careful to affirm the importance of  morals, 
Machiavelli argues that leaders must often forsake their morality in order to dominate the political 
arena. He writes: 
So, a prince is forced to know how to act like a beast, he should learn from the fox and the 
lion; […] one must be a fox to recognise traps, and a lion to frighten off  wolves. […] So it 
follows that a prudent ruler cannot, and should not, honour his word when it places him at a 
disadvantage and when the reasons for which he made his promise no longer exist. 
(Machiavelli, 1961: 99) 
The means, however condemnable, are justified by the end in Machiavellian thought. If  a leader 
aims to be extraordinary in his success, he cannot achieve this with morals alone; in some cases these 
morals may even hold him back. 
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[C]ontemporary experience shows that princes who have achieved great things have been 
those who have given their word lightly, who have known how to trick men with their 
cunning, and who, in the end, have overcome those abiding by honest principles. (Ibid.: 99) 
In the field of  psychology, this book and Machiavelli's thought in general have become the basis of  
Machiavellian Intelligence (MI), a form of  social intelligence. 
Until about the mid 20th century the term ‘Machiavellian’ had been used in a 
predominantly negative way to imply a person’s selfish use of  artifice, manipulating others for their 
own purpose. In the 1960’s social psychologists Richard Christie and Florence L. Geis started using 
the term “Machiavellianism” as a distinct personality trait and in 1970 published a book that 
illustrated a new use of  the term in psychology referring to a person’s tendency to manipulate others 
(Christie & Geis, 1970). As shall be made clear, however, this was just one take on Machiavelli’s 
place in psychology and social interaction. 
3.2.2 Anchoring MI in Evolutionary, Social and Cognitive Psychology 
Nicholas Humphrey's paper “The Social Function of  Intellect” (1976) is widely considered an 
important stepping stone between conventional social intelligence and MI in its most realised and 
specified form. According to Whiten and Byrne, the paper was “the single most important 
seed” (Whiten & Byrne, 1992: 1) for the growth of  the MI field. 
The paper explores social intelligence, mostly in its chimpanzee and human manifestations. 
Whilst Humphrey does not reference to Machiavelli nor coin the term MI, he draws attention to 
tendencies exhibited by chimpanzees which can be described as examples of  MI since the term has 
been defined. This is most tangibly illustrated in the following extract from the paper. 
[T]he life of  social animals is highly problematical. In a complex society, such as those we 
know exist in higher primates, there are benefits to be gained for each individual member 
both from preserving the overall structure of  the group and at the same time from exploiting 
and out-manoeuvring others within it. […] In such a situation, 'social skill' goes hand in 
hand with intellect, and here at last the intellectual faculties required are of  the highest 
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order. The game of  social plot and counter-plot cannot be played merely on the basis of  
accumulated knowledge, any more than can a game of  chess. (Humphrey, 1976: 307) 
We can go back even further in history and shift focus to the realm of  human beings as opposed to 
other primates; Hartshorne and May recorded the first large-scale study of  deception in children in 
an experiment from 1928. This was noted by LaFerniere in the eponymous book “Machiavellian 
Intelligence” (Whiten & Byrne, 1992), which will be explored in detail in due course. Hartshorne 
and May made observations on cheating among 11,000 children in test contexts. The research 
revealed that cheating was highly prevalent in the experiment’s subjects, who were aged from 8 to 
16. They concluded that deceit is situational, meaning that it is more likely to be used in a specific 
situation by many individuals if  there is necessity and there seems to be no other way around it. 
This concept is contrasted with the view that deceit is a “unitary” (i.e. permanent) character trait 
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	 Primates Explained 
	 Anthropoids (Simians) 
	 	 Apes lack external tails and are more intelligent than other 
	 	 primates more reliant on learned behaviour patterns for survival 
	 	 	 Great apes or Hominidae: Orangutan, chimpanzee 		
	 	 	 (+bonobo), gorilla, human 
	 	 	 Lesser ape or Hylobatidae: Gibbon  
	 	 Monkeys are grouped as 
	 	 	 Old World or Cercopithecida: More intelligent than New 	
	 	 	 World, tails are not prehensile. Examples include baboons, 
	 	 	 macaques and mandrills. 
	 	 and 
	 	 	 New World or Platyrrhini: Flatter and narrower nose.	
	 	 	 Unlike Apes and most Old World monkeys their thumbs are 
	 	 	 not opposable. Examples include howler monkeys, spider 	
	 	 	 monkeys and tamarins. 
	 – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – 
	 Prosimians (Non-Simians) 
	 More primitive characteristics than those of the simians (monkeys, apes 
	 and humans); lack colour vision and are frequently nocturnal; less		
	 intelligent and smaller brained. Examples include Lemurs and Lorises. 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 [box7]
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that follows a person through any situation and is used regardless of  the need; we will explore this 
view of  MI in a later subchapter. Hartshorne and May came to another conclusion from the study, 
namely that the ability to deceive can be improved, if  nurture is provided, and it is likely to be 
handed down as a family trait (LaFreniere, 1992: 240). 
No reference is given to Machiavelli, and both the example of  Humphrey, and Hartshorne 
and May, predate the coinage of  the term MI, by 60 years in the case of  the latter. However, they 
reveal that deception has long been an area of  interest for people involved in science, philosophy 
and teaching, amongst other fields. We will return to MI in regards to human behaviour later in the 
chapter. 
“Chimpanzee Politics”, a book by Dutch primatologist Lars de Waal is probably the first 
piece of  academic literature in which normal behaviour is described as specifically Machiavellian in 
nature. This is opposed to the earlier mentioned work of  Geis and Christie, which uses the 
Machiavellian label in a negative tone; this will be revisited in the next subchapter. As the title 
suggests, the book focuses on the politics of  a clan of  captive chimpanzees: the power struggles, 
conflicts, alliances, and of  course, deception. In the introduction, de Waal makes the following 
statement: 
Whole passages of  Machiavelli seem to be directly applicable to chimpanzee behaviour. The 
struggle for power and the resultant opportunism is so marked among these creatures that a 
radio reporter once thought to try and surprise me with the question: 'Who do you consider 
to be the biggest chimpanzee in our present government?’ (de Waal, 1982: 19) 
While tongue-in-cheek, in retrospect this observation from de Waal seems to be a landmark in social 
psychology; de Waal uses Machiavelli as a vehicle to illustrate that politics are not confined to 
governmental practice, but are present in everyday life not just for chimpanzees but also for human 
beings. De Waal writes in the conclusion of  his work “Chimpanzee Politics”: 
Nearly five centuries ago Machiavelli described the political manipulations of  the Italian 
princes, popes and influential families [...] without equivocation. Unfortunately his 
admirably realistic analysis has often been mistaken for moral justification of  these practices. 
One reason for this was that he presented rivalries and conflicts as constructive and not 
negative elements. Machiavelli was the first man to refuse to repudiate or cover up power 
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motives. This violation of  the existing collective lie was not kindly received. It was regarded 
as an insult to humanity. (de Waal, 1982: 212) 
This statement can be extended as an acknowledgement of  social politics and the use of  MI as 
something which should not necessarily be condemned but is in fact a normal factor in human 
interaction – another important observation from de Waal. 
In 1988 Richard Byrne and Andrew Whiten compiled and edited a collection of  essays titled 
“Machiavellian Intelligence - Social Expertise and the Evolution of  Intellect in Monkeys, Apes and 
Humans”. With this title we see the first use of  the term MI within academic literature. The 
collection of  essays within the book recount numerous observations of  primates exhibiting 
behaviour describable as Machiavellian. Many of  these examples bear resemblance to those 
documented by de Waal in “Chimpanzee Politics”. De Waal is also credited in the book, among 
others, as being an influence for the work which lent its name to the field of  MI. 
	 The cover page of  the 1992 edition of  the book by Whiten and Byrne bears a cartoony 
illustration of  an observation recorded in an essay by the pair titled “The Manipulation of  attention 
in primate tactical deception”. As is suggested by its use as cover-image, this observation 
encapsulates the basis of  MI; it takes place as follows: 
The idea of  the primate as 'psychologist' or 'mind reader' (Premack and Woodruff  1978; 
Humphrey 1980; Krebs and Dawkins 1984[...]) thus starts to get purchase in specific records 
of  behaviour. Consider the following instance […]: 
	 The unit was resting. An adult female spent 20 minutes in gradually shifting in a 
seated position over a distance of  about 2 metres to a place behind a rock about 50 cm high 
where she began to groom the subadult follower of  the unit – an interaction not tolerated by 
the adult male. As I was observing from a cliff  slightly above the unit, I could judge that the 
adult male leader could, from his resting position, see the tail, back and crown of  the 
female's head, but not her front, arms and face; the subadult male sat in a bent position 
while being groomed and was also invisible to the leader. The only aspect that made me 
doubt that the arrangement was accidental was the exceptionally slow, inch by inch shifting 
of  the female. This had in fact caused me to focus on her behaviour so long before she had 
reached the final position (No. 26. Kummer, Hamadyras baboons). 
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	 Kummer's observation shows that the female carefully adjusted her behaviour to a 
goal-state in which the target (the adult male leader) was unable to attend to what her hands 
were doing. (Whiten & Byrne, 1992: 215) 
Here the reader can see the employment of  ToM in a Machiavellian manner, the use of  a perceived 
false belief in another to deceive and fulfil one's own desire. Here baboons, Old World Monkeys, are 
either taking advantage of  a situation for their own gratification or manipulating a situation in order 
to systematically mislead a patriarch, using second-order representation in the process. This 
example, whilst offering an insight into the social functions of  the baboon, also illustrates a clear and 
valuable link between MI and ToM. 
Furthermore, this is not the only example of  interplay between MI and ToM in primates 
given by Whiten and Byrne. The pair also reference de Waal and his observation of  similar 
behaviour in chimpanzees in which ToM, and with it MI, is implemented in order for a male to 
deceive rivals in pursuit of  a female. In a different scenario, in which Whiten and Byrne cite the 
work of  Fossey, an individual gorilla is documented as having withheld information from its group or 
clan pertaining to a source of  food. The gorilla then pretends to be engaged with self-grooming so 
that the other gorillas will move on and their attention will not be drawn to the location of  the food 
source, namely a Loranthus vine. The single gorilla then goes alone to obtain the vine for itself  when 
the rest of  the group is sufficiently distracted (Fossey in Whiten & Byrne, 1992: 218). This scenario 
seems to resemble in some way a false-belief test, such as the Sally-Anne task. In the case of  the apes, 
one gorilla is fortunate enough to possess knowledge which its kin do not. It seems to be aware of  
this and acts in an according Machiavellian manner to keep this knowledge secret, thus keeping the 
food all to itself. The Sally-Anne test is designed to ascertain whether a child has developed ToM by 
establishing whether or not that child is able to conceive that people can have divergent beliefs and 
knowledge to their own, i.e. whether they can understand the concept of  false beliefs. From this, one 
might postulate that these primates have a more developed ToM than a human being under the age 
of  3 years old and in some cases older. It is through using ToM in a practical though conniving way 
that these primates have gained an advantage over their social rivals in certain situations; to the 
creatures' defence, their actions may be justified with the age-old aphorism, ‘What they don't know, 
can't hurt 'em.’  
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3.2.3 A Problem for Machiavellian Intelligence – a Horse with no Name? 
The concept of  MI can be confusing, as it is a problematic task to define what this term means. 
Byrne and Whiten note in their next book revisiting MI - “Machiavellian Intelligence II: Extensions 
and Evaluations”. 
The book that brought in the name did not even contain a single, clear definition of  the 
Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis (Byrne and Whiten, 1988a)! This was not simply 
carelessness, but a reflection of  the reality. In many ways, 'Machiavellian intelligence' is 
better seen, not as a precise theory, but as a banner for a cluster of  hypotheses that have 
been under active investigation since before we coined the label. (Byrne & Whiten, 1997: 1) 
We can see through its history, how young the term MI itself  is. Not only is it new but it is 
undefined, with the only slightly older term ‘Machiavellianism’ not helping to clarify the semantics 
but adding to the fog of  ambiguity. It is hoped that the reader has, via reading the preceding 
subchapters, formed at least a rudimentary conception of  what is meant by Machiavellian 
Intelligence. 
Judging from the overview of  psychological dictionaries, psychologists have only agreed on 
the very basic meaning of  Machiavellianism, namely that it is a personality trait with patterns of  
behaviours such as manipulation of  others through guile, deception and opportunism, as well as a 
general trait of  apathy (Reber & Reber, 2001: 407). It should be reiterated that this use of  
Machiavelli in psychology is but one perspective. 
To offer additional guidance for the grasping of  the nature of  MI, Whiten and Byrne state 
that, “All these [MI] hypotheses share one thing: the implication that possession of  the cognitive 
capability we call 'intelligence' is linked with social living and the problems of  complexity it can 
pose”  (Whiten & Byrne ,1997: 1). The book edited by Whiten and Byrne provides a further account 
of  theoretical understanding of  the term MI as well as the related term Machiavellianism: 
In this psychological literature, which now exceeds 300 references, Machiavellianism is seen 
as a kind of  personality trait, with its own tests on which individuals may score as 'high-
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Machs' or 'low-Machs'. Machiavellianism is defined by Wilson et al. as 'a strategy of  social 
conduct that involves manipulating others for personal gain, often against the other's self-
interest', in line with its common colloquial usage. Wilson et al. (1996) suggest that our own 
use of  the term implies something broader than this, such that all forms of  social intelligence 
in primates (and perhaps other taxa) are included. This is true: we include not only actions 
consistent with Machiavellianism in the colloquial sense of  relatively short-term personal 
gain, such as deception, but also acts such as helping and co-operation that are 
conventionally seen as alternative strategies. (Whiten & Byrne, 1997: 12) 
It becomes apparent through an assessment of  the literature in the realms of  Machiavellianism and 
MI that both fields of  research are focusing on similar or arguably the same phenomena, however 
from different perspectives. 
On one hand, we have MI, which views Machiavellian traits as intrinsic to the interactive 
behaviour of  humans and other primates, to the degree that it is these traits which have granted our 
species an evolutionary advantage over others. 
On the other hand, we have Machiavellianism, which views these same traits as a personality 
trait displayed by certain individuals, and when these traits are too prevalent, individuals are almost 
diagnosed with the seemingly pathological label of  ‘High Mach’. This applies to the perspective of  
the work of  Geis and Christie and their Mach IV scale; the Mach IV scale will be discussed in a 
later subchapter.   
In both cases, MI and Machiavellianism, certain Machiavellian traits come under focus, 
most notably deception and manipulation. The difference between the fields seems to be that one 
school of  thought perceives Machiavellian personality traits as a potential benefit, whilst the other 
school of  thought views Machiavellian personality traits as a potential character flaw or even a 
psychological disorder. 
Furthermore, as the above quote from “Machiavellian Intelligence II” alludes, there is a divergence 
between the two Machiavellian schools in terms of  their breadth, the school of  MI taking into 
account more than just deception. Despite this claim from Whiten, Byrne and Wilson, that MI 
encompasses a wider range of  social intelligence attributes than merely deception, MI does have the 
tendency to focus strongly on deception, warranting the use of  Machiavelli’s name in their banner. 
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As Whiten and Byrne state in “Machiavellian Intelligence II”, “[...] it may sometimes be 
helpful to distinguish 'narrow Machiavellianism' when referring more specifically to the high-Mach/
low-Mach dimension of  variation” (Whiten & Byrne, 1997: 13). 
With this in mind one may prefer to refer to both MI and Machiavellianism as 
Machiavellianism, but refer to the latter as “narrow Machiavellianism”. We will refrain, in this 
project, from making this semantic distinction however, and stick with referring to each school of  
thought as MI, on the grounds that the term MI is broader and in effect encompasses the 
phenomena of  Machiavellianism or “narrow Machiavellianism” in its definition. We will only use 
the term Machiavellianism if  this is done so in the context of  a specific text under discussion. 
As we have outlined what MI or Machiavellianism entails, placing most significance on 
deception, it is pertinent now to clearly define what is meant by the term ‘deception’. Here again, 
we need look no further than Whiten and Byrne for a definition - “Tactical Deception: 'Acts from 
the normal repertoire of  the agent, deployed such that another individual is likely to misinterpret 
what the acts signify, to the advantage of  the agent'. (Byrne & Whiten, 1992, p. 611)” (Hauser, 1997: 
115). Here the reader will see that the word “tactical” has been tagged onto the term deception. 
This highlights the Machiavellian element of  this specific form of  deception i.e. that there is a 
specific gain to be had in the act of  deception, or a certain clandestine purpose and intentionality 
for the act of  deceiving another. When the term ‘deception’ is used in this paper, the reader can 
assume that the full term “tactical deception” is implied. 
We have, whilst endeavouring to define Machiavellian Intelligence as it will be used in our 
project, encountered one of  the key problems for the field of  study. Before exploring MI and its 
relation to Theory of  Mind further, as well as our own theoretical inferences, we feel that it would 
be pertinent to look at some of  the other problem areas and challenges to the MI field. 
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3.2.4 Critique of  the study of  MI 
The reliability of  the conclusions reached by researchers for their observation is an obvious problem 
area in the study of  MI, particularly in regards to primatologists. As de Waal concedes: 
But who can guarantee that the many interpretations in this book are in fact the truth? 
Although I feel that after all these years I know the group [of  chimpanzees] intimately and 
am seldom wrong about the events that take place in it, I cannot be absolutely sure. To study 
animal behaviour is to interpret, but with a constant gnawing feeling that the interpretation 
may not be the right one. (de Waal, 1982: 29-30) 
MI as a field of  study here concedes a flaw in that it often focuses heavily on observing non-human 
primates, with manifold differences including language. It is therefore an undeniable truth that any 
and all observations of  non-human subjects can never be concluded as facts. However, this reality 
does not make research work and literature in MI redundant by any stretch, but calls for 
understanding and awareness from an interpreter or reader. 
A related point of  criticism for the field of  MI is its tendency to exclude non-primate beings 
from its research and conclusions. This is explained in “Machiavellian Intelligence II” by Marina 
Cords in her essay “Friendships, alliances, reciprocity and repair”: 
The degree to which these distinctive features of  primate societies are limited to primates is 
debatable [...] Unfortunately social behaviour of  non-primates has generally been studied 
less than that of  primates (Harcourt, 1988), which automatically biases our perception of  
potentially unique primate characteristics. (Cords, 1997: 25) 
Another problem, which has been touched upon in an earlier subchapter, is the ambiguity of  the 
field, the lack of  a precise definition of  MI due in part to the organic spawning of  the hypotheses 
following the publication of  the first “Machiavellian Intelligence” book from Whiten and Byrne. 
Gigerenzer expands upon this in her contribution to “Machiavellian Intelligence II”, when she 
writes of  MI: 
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It is vague because the nature of  the intelligence it invokes is largely unclear, and as a 
consequence, the mechanisms of  social intelligence have not yet been specified. This 
combination of  exciting and imprecise should be an alarming signal. The social intelligence 
hypothesis has the seductive power of  a political party with no precise programme that 
allows everyone unhappy with the established system to project his or her own values on it. 
(Gigerenzer, 1997: 264) 
The point to take from this subchapter is that, like much thought in fields such as psychology and 
philosophy, MI should be taken with ‘a grain of  salt’ or viewed with a critical eye. This will be 
demonstrated in the next sub-chapter in which we further examine the link between ToM and MI. 
3.2.5 Furthering a Link between MI and ToM 
It has been contested, whether MI and ToM are linked and if  they are, how so. This can be seen in 
the paper “Mind-Reading and Manipulation – Is Machiavellianism Related to Theory of  Mind?” 
by Lyons, Caldwell and Shultz. 
In this paper, Lyons et al. outline research in which 60 Subjects, of  mixed sex with a mean 
age of  33.97 years from the North West of  England, were given tests to infer firstly ToM followed by 
Machiavellianism. These tests were the Eyes test (ToM) then IMT task (ToM), followed by the Mach 
IV scale (Machiavellianism). We will only describe the Mach IV scale for the reader, as it is most 
appropriate to this section of  the paper. It was also the only test used to detect Machiavellianism in 
the subjects, and therefore wanting of  particular scrutiny. 
The Mach IV Scale was developed by Geis and Christie in 1970, publishing their book 
“Studies in Machiavellianism” as discussed in the introductory subchapter (Christie & Geis, 1970). 
The Mach IV scale is used to place subjects on a scale distinguishing them as low or high Machs. 20 
questions are asked in regards to human nature. There are five potential answers for each question, 
strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree and strongly agree. The questions take the form of  
statements – some statements featured in the test are: “Never tell anyone the real reason you did 
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something unless it is useful to do so”; “Honesty is the best policy in all cases”; and “Most people 
forget more easily the death of  their parents than the loss of  their property” (Christie & Geis, 1970). 
According to the results of  these tests, the authors found a relationship between ToM and 
MI which may seem surprising and counterintuitive. They postulate that the relationship is a 
negative one, as those who scored high on the ToM tests, also scored low on the Mach IV scale. 
Their findings were that high-Machs have a poor level of  ToM, even suggesting with reference to 
other studies that perhaps, 
[...] Machiavellianism could be a manifestation of  sub-clinical psychopathy. It is possible that 
in a similar manner to psychopaths, high-Machs have deficits in frontal lobes [of  the brain], 
possibly even in the structures related to the Mirror Neuron System, which could result in 
malfunctioning of  social cognition. (Shamay-Tsoory, Aharon-Peretz and Perry, 2008). 
Knowing that mirror neurons are intricately linked with the understanding of  others and 
feeling empathy (Iacoboni and Dabretto, 2006; Shulte-Ruther et al., 2007), the idea that 
Machiavellian ToM deficits reflect a malfunctioning of  the mirror neuron system is 
appealing. (Lyons et al., 2010: 269) 
Our opinion is, that in asking someone a short series of  questions with a clear focus in a research 
environment, one runs the risk of  constructing artificial or biased results and a manipulated 
outcome. As can be seen by looking at the questions asked in the Mach IV scale, the statements used 
are generalisations and leave no room for discussion of  variables beyond an answer of  either 
strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree or strongly agree. It therefore seems like a stretch to argue 
that Machiavellianism can be explained by defective mirror neurons and comparing high-Machs to 
psychopaths seems unjustified. 
Furthermore, it could be argued that many Machs did not even answer honestly to the test 
questions, concealing evidence as their deceptive nature would tend towards; this, however, is mere 
speculation. With this in mind, we disagree fundamentally with the findings of  Lyons et al., though 
their perspective of  a negative relationship between MI and ToM is interesting and deserving of  
acknowledgement. 
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Lyons et al. are by no means the first to have questioned the link between MI and ToM; discussions 
have proved contentious within the social psychological and cognitive psychological fields. 
According to an article published on the US National Library of  Medicine National Institutes of  
Health website, Professors Paal and Bereczkei found no relation between Machiavellianism and 
ToM in their 2007 study. Numerous other studies, however, including another study from Bereczkei 
from 2007, “[...] have suggested that Machiavellians are excellent mind readers” (Al Aïn et al., 
2013). 
Moreover, the influential autism and ToM researcher Simon Baron-Cohen finds in his paper 
“Out of  Sight or Out of  Mind? Another look at Deception in Autism” (1992) that autists struggle in 
simple tasks of  deception, just as they do in ToM tasks. He suggests that an absence of  ToM as well 
as a handicap in regards to deception is not a mere coincidence, furthering the link between ToM 
and MI (Baron-Cohen, 1992: 1153).  
From our own research, we feel that the link between MI and ToM is undeniable. This can 
be inferred particularly if  we look to the observations within both books entitled “Machiavellian 
Intelligence” by Whiten and Byrne, and the examples given of  MI being exhibited thanks to an 
ability to mentalise and use of  higher-order thinking. This can be seen in the case mentioned earlier 
in the chapter, in which the subordinate baboon was being groomed by a female out-of-sight and 
out-of-mind from the alpha male. In this case, these Machiavellian monkeys are clearly 
demonstrating high cognitive function, which counters the findings from Lyons et al. that high MI 
equals poor cognition (Lyons et al., 2010: 268). 
It seems to us that MI is a product of  ToM, and that ToM must be called into play when MI 
is implemented. In order to effectively deceive “[...] individuals must not only know that certain acts 
lead to certain responses, but know why (Ryle, 1949) this is true - they must have a kind of  theory of  
mind that is based on an understanding of  the mechanisms underlying misrepresentation (e.g. 
altering belief  states)” (Hauser, 1997: 122). 
Deception in the MI dimension involves being at least one step ahead of  a target, to know 
what they will do next. The best way to predict this behaviour is to know what they are thinking 
about. For this it is necessary to understand the target’s inner world - their Theory of  Mind. In other 
words, ToM is a prerequisite necessary for being able to deceive effectively. 
To return to the aforementioned article by Lyons et al., the standpoint that MI and ToM 
have a dichotomous relationship, adopts a reductionist view of  both ToM and Machiavellianism. 
High-Machs are presented as being void of  empathy, perhaps even mildly psychopathic. However, 
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this is just one interpretation of  MI. In our opinion, to say that there is no place for empathy in MI 
is not necessarily true. In fact, this could be seen as the trait which separates high-Machs from 
psychopaths, the difference between MI and psychopathy. From our research we have come to the 
understanding that people with highly developed MI do have empathy, but also have the ability to 
switch off  this emotional interference in any given situation which requires pragmatic conduct, 
whether morally condemnable or not. It is the ability to not let emotions and worrying about others’ 
feelings cloud one’s judgements and focus; this is not to say that the emotions, worries and feelings 
are not there at all. 
It may even be argued that when testing subjects for ToM one also inevitably touches upon 
MI in the process. In his essay “The Machiavellian Mindreader”, Whiten illustrates the 
inextricability of  MI and ToM, stating that, “[...] so many tests of  false-belief  understanding can be 
thought of  as implicit exercises in deception [...]” (Whiten, 1997: 154). An obvious example of  such 
a test would be the classic Sally-Anne test which has been outlined in depth in the introductory 
chapter to this project. In this test one can infer that “Although the motives of  Anne are usually not 
specified, she can be seen as 'playing a trick' on Sally” (Ibid.: 154). Therefore Anne is in fact 
implementing MI, and the observer to the test is not just exhibiting ToM in assessing the scenario, 
but also inadvertently MI, or at least witnessing it as exemplified in a basic form. Therefore, “[...] 
the Machiavellian context of  deceit may be a potent early context for children's emerging grasp of  
the way the mind (mis)represents” (Ibid.: 155). 
3.2.6 A Closer Look at Human Deception 
MI in humans largely revolves around tactical deception. The importance of  deception in human 
affairs has been recognised and studied in the fields of  political philosophy and military analysis. It 
may be true to say that warfare, where humans are faced with the most brutal challenges, is one of  
the most dramatic illustrations of  the human capacity for deceit; however, our focus brings us to 
look at it from the cognitive point of  view. 
From birth human infants are well equipped with reflexes to enable successful 
communication with adults, especially parents. One study shows how when babies are born they 
recognise and prefer their mother's vocal tones (Decasper & Fifer, 1980: 1174-1176). 
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However, as they grow up, depending on infants’ egocentric wishes, they may make use of  their 
abilities for their own advantage, for example, crying for more food, or when they want something, 
or behaving well in order to get their parents to buy a particular item. 
As we move closer towards discussing deception in adults, it is worth mentioning researchers 
Ekman and Friesen, who conducted one of  the first notable studies on deceptive behaviour in adults 
(LaFerniere, 1992: 244). Here body language finds relevance in implementing and detecting 
deception. According to Ekman and Friesen, in the process of  initiating a deceitful act, an agent 
makes use of  either inhibition, simulation, or as happens in most cases, blends the two together. 
In proceeding with inhibition, the agent has the option of  adjusting or completely inhibiting 
his/her emotion in order to achieve a beneficial outcome. This allows the agent to hide or minimise 
the explicit cues of  their deceptive plan. Simulation, on the other hand, means to pretend or act as if  
nothing has been concealed. This form of  behaviour is a little more sophisticated, in that it keeps 
the flow of  communication intact and, with fewer or no gaps in communication, makes it less likely 
for the target to recognise the signs of  deception (LaFerniere, 1992: 244-245). 
“Ekman and Friesen identify the face as the focal point in affective expression: it has the 
greatest sending capacity. The legs/feet are usually the poorest non-verbal senders, while the hands 
are intermediate” (LaFerniere, 1992: 245). Since most people often focus on the face for finding lies, 
they also expect others to look at their face when lying and hence are more prepared to suppress 
facial expressions while carrying out deception. This brings us to an interesting derivation, namely, 
that the face, which is most likely to betray deception, can also be the best at concealing it. 
The face as the betrayer of  mental states comes into focus in the work of  psychologists 
Caroline Keating and Karen Heltman, who elucidate the connection between being good at 
deception and having high social status. In looking at their research, it becomes apparent that 
whether through white lies, openly or secretly, at some point virtually all social leaders in social 
groups use some sort of  tactical deception. By using a set of  sociological criteria, before carrying out 
their experiments, Keating and Heltman first determined the different levels of  social dominance of  
their subjects. These subjects were preschool children, who were given two glasses of  orange juice, 
one of  which contained quinine, making it taste very bitter, the other a normal glass of  orange juice. 
They were then asked to convince an assistant by pretending that while they drank the juice, both of  
the juices tasted good. Most of  the children found grimacing hard to avoid as they drank the bitter 
juice. The whole experiment was recorded and shown to an independent panel of  judges who had 
to guess which children were lying and which were telling the truth. The result was that those 
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children who scored high in dominance, were also the ones who were good at tricking the judges 
(Gärdenfors, 2003: 105-106). 
This is only a fraction of  the academic research and literature in regards to deception. It 
should also be noted that this chapter has focused mostly on tactical deception, since, as expressed 
earlier, this is the most relevant form of  deception to our paper. But there is a broad spectrum of  
deception and a vast quantity of  information regarding deception out there. This exposes the 
inescapable presence of  deception in the lives of  human beings, as well as other animals, and shows 
that an understanding of  the intricacies of  the phenomenon could be highly beneficial for us in our 
daily lives.  
3.2.7 “Why are you telling me all this?” – Practical Applications 
The purpose of  the work of  Byrne and Whiten’s “Machiavellian Intelligence I” and “II” was to 
provide an alternative hypothesis for understanding the advanced evolution of  primates in contrast 
to other animals. They proposed that the evolution of  intelligence in humans and our primate 
ancestors, “[...] was primarily driven by selection for manipulative, social expertise with groups 
where the most challenging problem faced by individuals was dealing with their 
companions” (Whiten & Byrne, 1997: Abstract). 
	 The MI hypotheses are presented amongst parallel hypotheses such as those that conclude, 
as Whiten and Byrne state, “[...] that intelligence evolved in response to an increasing technological 
sophistication of  tools, or that it evolved to deal with the spatial memory problem of  finding widely 
dispersed, ephemeral, but predictable food resources” (Whiten & Byrne, 1992: Preface). So the MI 
hypotheses can be taken to function in conjunction with or as an alternative to the other 
aforementioned explanations for the excelled evolution of  primates. 
	 The enlargement of  the neocortex brain region in primates is generally accepted to have 
facilitated the heightened cognition of  primates, specifically humans. The MI hypotheses infer that 
this cognition is most significantly amplified in regards to social intelligence, or that it may have in 
fact been the development of  MI that resulted in the neocortical enlargement (Byrne, 1997: 294). 
	 This seems to leave us in a circular ‘what came first: the chicken or the egg?’ dilemma, into 
which further investigation would be irrelevant for the purpose of  this project. What will be 
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explored in this subchapter is the purpose of  MI and why a deepened understanding of  it could be 
beneficial in everyday life as a human being. 
MI may be wrongly interpreted as a function serving only selfish goals and ends via deplorable and 
duplicitous means; however, there are practical, beneficial and benign applications of  MI. 
To draw on an example, Jane and George work in the same advertising firm. Jane has 
suffered a blow to her confidence after the last clients told her that her ideas were boring. Partners 
Jane and George have been given a new project with a new client, but Jane is having difficulties 
getting anything done because her confidence is damaged and she cannot get the comments out of  
her head. George tells Jane, “Don’t worry about the last job, Jane. Those clients didn’t know what 
they were talking about and besides, you’re the best employee this firm has! I’ve even heard rumours 
that you’re being considered for a promotion because of  your creativity.” 
	 George is of  course lying. Jane is most certainly not the best in the office and to his 
knowledge no such promotion for any member of  staff  is being considered. But thanks to this kind 
ego-boost, George and Jane put together a great campaign for their new clients, who are highly 
satisfied. In the end George is given a sudden promotion, as his boss Sara is very pleased with his 
enthusiasm and work ethic. In this scenario three positive outcomes have been reached thanks to 
clever use of  MI - the achievement of  a joint goal, the revival of  Jane as a productive worker, and 
George getting an unexpected promotion. 
Another example of  MI’s place in every-day human interaction could be sparing someone 
the truth to avoid hurting their feelings or otherwise withholding information that will only be 
damaging, harmful or destructive in a social situation, helping no one. 'White lies' are an accepted 
aspect of  social interaction which can be seen as necessary or even essential in certain contexts. 
When we lie to our children in order to trick them into behaving, cleaning their rooms, or eating 
their greens, we are using MI, trying to instil a false belief in them so that they will do as we desire. 
	  
MI may also be considered, as Miller states in his essay from “Machiavellian Intelligence II”, as 
“resistance to mind reading” (Miller, 1997: 313). It can take on several forms such as, “[...] (a) hiding 
intentions (the Poker Face strategy), (b) tactical deception and disinformation (the KGB strategy), 
and (c) adaptive unpredictability (the Protean strategy)” (Miller, 1997: 313). 
According to Miller, when we implement MI we are effectively mentalising to resist being 
mindread ourselves, using higher-order reasoning or meta-reasoning in which the aim is to either 
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disguise our behaviour; or confuse, deceive or disinform the reasoning of  another by adapting our 
behaviour. In addition, this interpretation of  MI from Miller underscores the relationship between 
MI and ToM. 
If  all else is put aside, the development or understanding of  MI in an individual can be 
beneficial so that one may not be duped in daily life, whether that be in personal relationships or 
simply amongst everyday interactions where contact with other people is unavoidable. It can help us 
to see through the often deceptive façade of  marketing, business or politics, arming individuals with 
a healthy scepticism and an understanding that how people behave outwardly may not embody 
what is going on in their minds; what their true intentions and desires are is often kept clandestine in 
order to maximise the potential for achieving intentions and satisfying desires. 
According to an article in the English newspaper The Telegraph from November 2014, the 
average Briton lies approximately 10 times a week (Association Press, 2014). This conclusion was 
made through an online poll of  2000 people, but whether or not the results are infallible, they reveal 
that lying is a part of  daily life for human beings, whether one is the liar or the lied to. Here we see 
the importance of  MI. Whether we like it or not, lying takes place on a daily basis. If  we can accept 
this fact and sharpen our skills to see through the lies of  others and conversely hone our own lying, 
to be implemented when push comes to shove and a bit of  Machiavellian deception is necessary, 
then this will stand us in good stead for a successful and perhaps even a happier life. 
Schmitt and Grammer sum up the reality, normality, effect and benefit of  MI nicely with 
their essay from “Machiavellian Intelligence II”, entitled “Social intelligence and success: Don't be 
too clever in order to be smart”: 
Another case in point is altruism, which in theory may always be discovered to be in some 
way self-interested (Karylowski, 1982; Heal, 1991). But take a greeting smile, which may be 
interpreted either as a manipulation of  the other's mood and will to communicate, or as an 
expression of  friendly feelings towards the other. What about people co-operating in 
maintaining an interesting conversation, or in consoling empathically a crying child? [...] 
Does the parsimony principle [Occam’s razor] not command that we first take into account 
that a greeting smile is an expression of  friendly feelings, and nothing else? The use of  the 
term manipulation in the above cases seems to have too much of  a pejorative connotation. 
To sum up, in our view, social intelligence is the ability to skillfully enable or manage social 
interaction, with or without having something at the back of  the mind. (Schmitt & 
Grammer, 1997: 91-92) 
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3.2.8 Steve Jobs as an Exemplar of  Machiavellian Traits 
We will be using Steve Jobs’ biography as a case study for MI in the real world. It is by no means an 
evaluation of  his personality as a whole but rather an evaluation from this chapter’s perspective 
regarding his way of  using ToM and Machiavellian Intelligence. The following account may thus 
seem as if  we are only looking at the malevolent side of  the entrepreneur, but we remind the reader 
that this is owed to which traits we chose to highlight following our research angle.  
Much of  how we act in our adulthood is determined by what kind of  impressions we get 
about the world during our childhood. As infants and children, we all experience moments that may 
stay with us, shaping our character, perhaps remaining through adult life. Jobs was adopted as a 
child. He knew of  his adoption from an early age on, as his legal guardians were open about it. He 
thought of  himself  as having been abandoned but then again found, ‘chosen’, and was a person 
who had to deal with a number of  painful experiences. At one point, when Jobs was six or seven 
years old, he told the story of  his adoption to a girl who lived across the street. In reply he was met 
with: “So does that mean your real parents didn’t want you?” After which he ran into the house 
crying (Isaacson, 2011: 4). Jobs would have to learn to cope with emotional humiliation in order to 
survive in the social and later the competitive business environment. It could be argued that through 
experiences such as the above, Jobs learned to suppress emotions and be cold, thus developing the 
ability to switch off  the emotional interference of  empathy. We find this distinctly characteristic of  
MI. 
When Jobs’ father was 23, he would give up his son for adoption; Jobs would go on to father 
and give up a child of  his own, doing so at the exact same age “[...] He who is abandoned is an 
abandoner, [Chrisann Brennan, mother of  Jobs’ child]” (Isaacson, 2011: 5). 
 If  this characteristic was indeed caused by Jobs’ experiences as a child, it seems not far-
fetched to assume that it could have manifested itself  in his business strategy or in his way to deal 
with problems – making friends with people he needed and abandoning them when they would no 
longer be of  use to him? “[According to Andy Herzfeld] Steve is the opposite of  loyal, [...] He’s 
anti-loyal. He has to abandon the people he is close to” (Isaacson, 2011: 103). His biographer also 
somewhat affirms Herzfeld’s idea when he writes, 
He had been scattershot friendly to me over the years, with occasional bursts of  intensity, 
especially when he was launching a new product that he wanted on the cover of  Time or 
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featured on CNN, places where I’d worked. But now that I was no longer at either of  those 
places, I hadn’t heard from him much. (Isaacson, 2011: xvii) 
The reader can already grasp a general idea of  what kind of  social life Apple’s former CEO might 
have had and as we will step further into his biography, we will be seeing more of  MI manifesting 
itself  in Steve Jobs’ behaviour within his milieu. 
Apart from having a difficult upbringing, Jobs gained much of  his character from interacting 
with his friends while growing up. For our case, one of  the most notable people that left a life-long 
imprint on Jobs’ professional life was his fellow student at Reed College, Robert Friedland, with 
whom he shared philosophical interests on the Enlightenment and whom he regarded almost as a 
guru at the beginning of  their friendship. It is said that Jobs adopted some of  Friedland’s charismatic 
traits and learned a lot about selling, coming out of  his shell, and taking charge of  a situation. The 
following paragraphs speaks about how canny personality traits were woven into his character: 
[...] some of  Jobs’ personality traits - including a few that lasted throughout his career - were 
borrowed from Friedland. [...] “He was charismatic and a bit of  a con man and could bend 
situations to his very strong will. He was mercurial, sure of  himself, a little dictatorial. Steve 
admired that, and he became more like that after spending time with Robert.” (Isaacson, 
2011: 38) 
  
Initially neither Jobs nor Steve Wozniak, who was his closest friend and business partner, planned to 
make money out of  selling computers. Despite his appearance of  being unconcerned with financial 
profit, Jobs knew how to raise money and could do so in ways which can be described as 
Machiavellian. When something needed to be done and there were obstacles in his path to success, 
Steve knew how to talk to sales representatives. He knew how to make use of  his contacts. 
One day when working at Atari, Jobs was asked to develop a single-player version of  a 1972 
game called Pong, which, in short, was a digital, simplified version of  Ping Pong. Atari co-founder 
Nolan Bushnell, when asking Jobs to design it, told him that aside from a base pay there would be a 
bonus for economising on computer chips. For the job however, he would need to recruit a partner 
and for that he would choose his long-time friend and colleague Steve Wozniak. Wozniak was 
thrilled to hear about the offer and proposed splitting the pay, but Jobs did not mention anything 
about the bonus reward. After the work was done the base fee was split in half, as agreed, but the 
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bonus (which they managed to acquire), was kept by Jobs. By Jobs’ use of  MI, knowing that nothing 
would change in their friendship as long as Wozniak did not know about the bonus and only 
assumed the fair split of  the base fee, Jobs would gain money while retaining, if  not strengthening, 
his friendship with Wozniak. So it was a self-beneficial situation. A few years later the truth came 
out, but Jobs, for the sake of  defending his reputation and friendship, kept claiming his innocence 
(Isaacson, 2011: 52-54). 
In conclusion, Steve Jobs certainly had Machiavellian traits. The way he used his contacts, 
friends, and colleagues is a vivid portrayal of  MI in use for self-benefit. However, it must be said that 
his success brought a significant change to the world. Whether the change was positive or not is for 
the reader to judge, but overall, this is why Steve Jobs is a perfect example of  MI, because the end 
justified the means. 
3.2.9 Closing Remarks 
In this chapter we have discussed the origins and the definitions of  the Machiavellian Intelligence, as 
both “narrow” and ‘broad’ Machiavellianism, and how the Machiavellian dimension relates to 
Theory of  Mind. We have also provided a critique on current methods of  studying MI, and gone to 
length to expose the place MI has in the everyday life of  all human beings. We have explored the 
good and the bad, whereupon the only conclusion which we can reach is that, for better or worse, 
MI is a part of  life as a sentient being. With that in mind, improving one’s understanding of  MI can 
be said to hold benefit in today’s competitive society.  
"58
House 3.1.1, Group 2 Spring 2015
3.3 On the Construction and Refinement of  ToM 
Up until now, we have discussed all areas related to ToM with the premise that we talk about 
individuals who have both well-functioning and stable mentalising abilities.  As mentioned in the 
theory part, however, neither is necessarily the case. While autists represent a discernible group that 
lacks a Theory of  Mind, even in non-autistic individuals ToM is not a permanently fixed 
mechanism, as can be argued for instance from a theory theory point of  view. In the following two 
sections we will therefore take a look at processes of  compensating for the absence of  ToM and of  
refining ToM through mental stimulation, specifically reading fiction. 
3.3.1 Constructing a Theory of  Mind 
As mentioned earlier in the introduction to this paper, there is a strong connection between the 
development of  Theory of  Mind and autism. Autistic individuals severely lack a ToM, making them 
an interesting subject to study when looking at how ToM functions. In “An Anthropologist on 
Mars”, Oliver Sacks travels to Fort Collins, Colorado to visit a woman named Temple Grandin, an 
autistic woman who “in spite of  her autism […] holds a Ph.D. in animal science, teaches at 
Colorado State University, and runs her own business” (Sacks, 1995: 244). 
	 Autism was first described during the 1940’s by Hans Asperger, an Austrian pediatrician, 
medical theorist and medical professor, and Leo Kanner, an American psychiatrist and physician. 
They both had different views on autism, Kanner seeing it as an “unmitigated disaster” (Sacks, 
1995: 244) and Asperger viewing it as a “particular originality of  thought and experience, which 
may well lead to exceptional achievements in later life” (Sacks, 1995: 245). Kanner studied autistic 
children who suffered from more severe impairments, plagued with seizures and language disorders, 
hardly functioning within society. Asperger studied autistic children who adapted better to society, 
able to function in spite of  their impairments. During the 1970’s, English psychiatrist and physician 
Lorna Wing defined the core aspects of  autism as, “impairment of  social interaction with others, 
impairment of  verbal and nonverbal communication, and impairment of  play and imaginative 
activities” (Sacks, 1995: 246). In relation to our project, the main thing to focus on here is that most 
autistic individuals have an incomplete understanding of  minds, whether it is their own or others.  
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The perception of  autism has changed significantly since it was first diagnosed. For a period of  time 
in the 1960’s it was believed that autism was a psychogenic disorder caused by cold and distant 
“refrigerator” mothers. It is now understood to be biological, and there is increasing evidence 
towards it being partially genetic as well. In cases of  high-functioning autistic individuals (also 
diagnosed as having Asperger’s), there are often “[...] ‘islands of  ability,’ occasionally spectacular 
talents, shining through the devastation [...]” (Sacks, 1995: 250), which is exactly what we find in the 
case of  Temple Grandin. 
	 Grandin is unique in many ways, but for the sake of  our project we will  especially focus on 
her ability to reason about her own mind and that of  others. She accepts that other people have 
minds, and is aware that others feel something she cannot feel. Sacks describes Grandin’s experience 
trying to socialise during her time in college:   
Something was going on between the other kids, something swift, something subtle, 
constantly changing – an exchange of  meanings, a negotiation, a swiftness of  understanding 
so remarkable that sometimes she wondered if  they were all telepathic. She is now aware of  
the existence of  these social signals. She can infer them, she says, but she herself  cannot 
perceive them, cannot participate in this magical communication directly or convince the 
many-leveled kaleidoscopic states of  mind behind it. Knowing this intellectually she does her 
best to compensate, bringing immense intellectual effort and computational power to bear 
on matters that others understand with unthinking ease. This is why she often feels excluded, 
an alien. (Sacks, 1995: 272)     	  
Grandin has created her own Theory of  Mind through watching other social interactions and 
cataloguing everything like a “library of  videotapes, which she could play in her mind and inspect at 
any time” (Sacks, 1995: 260). This strikingly resembles simulation theory in its construction of  
another’s mental states in one’s own mind; only that usually this would happen of  its own accord, 
whereas Grandin has to put great effort into the creation of  her unique simulation archive. She uses 
this as a sort of  guidebook of  social functionality, referring back to her “library” at a moment’s 
notice to figure out how one is expected to act in any given situation. But if  one pays close attention 
one can pick up on small things about Grandin that do not fit within the framework of  normal 
human interaction. Her movements can seem mechanical, a hand raised too quickly and held too 
long. When Sacks first meets her at her office, he explains, “She sat me down with little ceremony, 
no preliminaries, no social niceties, no small talk about my trip of  how I liked Colorado” (Sacks, 
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1995: 256). Watching interviews with Grandin, one notices that she often interrupts the interviewer 
unapologetically, apparently unaware of  the polite social guidelines we normally follow in social 
interactions. 
Grandin has created for herself  another interesting way of  relating to other people, through 
something she calls the “Squeeze Machine”. As a child she had longed to be held but experienced 
conflicting emotions of  terror whenever she was touched. When attending university she saw a 
squeeze chute that was used to restrain calves without hurting them, and she immediately had the 
idea to create one big enough for a fully grown adult. She modified it in size and created a control 
system to change the levels of  pressure. Grandin explains that it calms her down, but not only that: 
it helps her maintain a connection to others. 
As she lies in her machine, she says, her thoughts often turn to her mother, her favorite aunt, 
her teachers. She feels their love for her, and hers for them. She feels that the machine opens 
a door into an otherwise closed emotional world and allows her, almost teaches her, to feel 
empathy for others. (Sacks, 1995: 264) 
This is in many ways remarkable. Her way of  simulating a comforting embrace is obviously 
unorthodox, and even seems bewildering to someone who can fully enjoy the benefits of  another 
human’s touch. On the other hand, this shows an astonishing amount of  awareness, for she seems to 
know precisely what is missing from her life, replicating it in a unique, individualised manner. This 
type of  self-awareness is not usually associated with autists, and a feat of  this sort brings to light the 
complexity and variability of  autistic individuals that is often ignored in popular discussions of  the 
topic.  
In another example of  Grandin’s difficulty in relating to complex emotions, she describes her 
troubles with understanding myths and fictional narratives. Even though Grandin claims that most 
of  this has to do with “sequencing difficulties”, it seems clear that the bigger issue was 
understanding the relationships between characters. “She was bewildered, she said, by Romeo and 
Juliet (‘I never knew what they were up to’), and with Hamlet she got lost with the back-and-forth of  
the play” (Sacks, 1995: 259). Grandin explains to Sacks that she was celibate, mainly because she 
could not understand the intricacies of  being in a relationship with another person: “[...] she was 
never sure what was being said, or implied, or asked, or expected” (Sacks, 1995: 285). On top of  this 
confusion, she also describes her inability to understand what it would feel like to fall in love, or even 
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what love really is. She uses words like “swooning” and “caring for”, but overall she cannot think 
past the logics of  it. The world seen through Grandin’s eyes is one that functions only on the 
premise of  control through routine and order; one of  mathematical diagrams of  cattle corrals, of  
reading science and livestock publications. Falling passionately in love would seem like a tornado 
crashing through this controlled lifestyle, and it is understandable why Grandin would have a hard 
time comprehending this type of  irrational emotion. 
Temple Grandin is a spectacular case. Her ability to think about her own mind and 
speculate about the minds of  others makes her an incredibly rare subject within the field of  Theory 
of  Mind. Her insight into her own mental library of  social interactions gives a clear image of  
processes within our own minds that we are hardly ever conscious of. Her emotional shortcomings, 
which seem restrictive from an outsider’s perspective, are actually the building blocks with which she 
creates her life. Her remarkable self-consciousness sheds a light on the mental states of  autistic 
individuals, allowing us to understand the intricacies of  a life without Theory of  Mind.  
3.3.2 Engaging and Refining ToM: The Impact of  Fiction on our Mind 
ToM researchers have emphasised the importance of  reading fiction and storytelling for the 
development of  ToM in kids (see Astington & Hughes, 2013: 19). However, once the abilities of  
mentalising have evolved to a functioning level, it is often assumed that this is more or less the end 
of  the story. Theory of  Mind is present and working, what more could we want? In shifting our 
focus towards adults, we would like to draw attention to the vital role fiction plays, even in later 
years, in engaging and facilitating our ToM. In fact, we shall argue that our ToM is central to our 
involvement with and, more specifically, enjoyment of  fiction, and that this is a reciprocal process, 
which comes to improve our ToM as it goes on. 
When Temple Grandin mentioned her bewilderment upon trying to read Romeo and Juliet, 
she was pointing towards a very important skill related to ToM: the ability to read a book or watch a 
movie and make sense of  insinuated emotions and intentions that fictional characters possess. Since 
these implicit mental states are the backbone to the progression of  the story, not understanding 
them leaves the reader with a nonsensical narrative, where there seems to be no meaning or 
motivation behind the actions of  the protagonists. Not only does this imply that Theory of  Mind is 
a key element in understanding fictional narratives, but as we will show in the following section, it 
also points towards the interdynamic relationship between consuming fiction and applications of  
ToM.  
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In her book “Why We Read Fiction” Lisa Zunshine explores the connections of  engaging 
with fiction and applying our Theory of  Mind. Her line of  argumentation gives credit to the fact 
that many of  us would think that the processes involved in taking pleasure in reading are going on 
automatically and effortlessly. Taking up this sentiment, Zunshine argues that any interpretation of  
an action happening in the plot is effortless only in the way that we attach it to a mental state of  the 
actor as such.  
Here an important distinction between cognitive psychologists and cognitive literary critics 
comes into play. Where the former would describe any process of  mentalising as ‘successful’ “[...] 
because of  the ease with which we correlate tears with an emotional state [...]” (Zunshine, 2012: 
Part 1, Section 3, Par. 8), the latter would put the attention on the correctness of  the attribution of  
the mental state. If  we, for instance, interpret those tears as tears of  joy, when really the person is 
crying out of  desperation, this would be a glaringly wrong attribution of  a mental state with possibly 
serious consequences. In other words, “Mind-reading is thus effortless in the sense that we 
‘intuitively’ connect people's behavior to their mental states [...], although our subsequent 
description of  these mental states could run a broad gamut from perceptively accurate to profoundly 
mistaken” (Ibid.). From a cognitive-psychological viewpoint, most of  us are flawless mindreaders by 
virtue of  the process itself, but in the sense of  attributing the correct mental state to characters, what 
might be happening with ease can still include serious flaws. Using ToM in order to unravel fictional 
narratives is then much more complex and error prone than we generally think it to be. Also, as we 
will see, the workings of  our Theory of  Mind do not simply proceed invisibly, unnoticed by our 
consciousness. 
In fact, Zunshine argues that much of  our enjoyment of  fiction actually hinges on us being 
conscious of  using our Theory of  Mind, as only then do we become able to appreciate the shifts in 
mental states that are taking place and, maybe even more so, the ease with which this process is 
proceeding. As Zunshine writes, “our enjoyment of  fiction is predicated--at least in part--upon our 
awareness of  our ‘trying on’ mental states potentially available to us but at a given moment differing from 
our own” (Ibid.: Part 1, Section 4, Par. 3). The awareness aspect of  this enjoyment comes out of  
what is described by literary critic Reuven Tsur as a disruption of  our cognitive processes, where the 
narrative enters our consciousness and upsets the default structure of  our mind. This makes us 
cognizant of  putting on mental states and in turn signals to our consciousness that our cognitive 
adaptations are working well (Ibid.: Part 1, Section 4, Par. 4):  
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Tsur argues that jokes are particularly pleasing because they serve as a fast test of  one’s 
cognitive well-being (i.e., “I laugh; therefore I must be generally able to shift mental states 
quickly”). It is possible, then, that certain cultural artefacts, such as novels, test the 
functioning of  our cognitive adaptations for mind-reading while keeping us pleasantly aware 
that the “test” is proceeding quite smoothly. That is, when I am wondering if  my uncle’s 
inconspicuous social standing will influence Mr. Darcy’s view of  me as a potential wife - and 
yet know that what I am really experiencing is a state of  mind of  Elizabeth Bennet, who is, 
after all, not me - I am being made aware that my Theory of  Mind must be functioning quite 
well. (So perhaps I will be all right out there in the real world, where my social survival 
absolutely depends on being able to imagine - correctly, incorrectly, approximately, self-
serving, bizarrely - other people’s thoughts, desires, and intentions around the clock.) 
(Zunshine, 2012: Part 1, Section 4, Par. 6) 
Now this is an easy concept to understand, although one that is pleasantly surprising when first 
considered. If  one can easily slip in and out of  mental states while reading a novel or watching a 
film, one must also be able to do so in real life when trying to imagine what someone else is thinking, 
thus making them able to move through social interactions with ease. While no fictional narrative 
supplies us with the ready-made instructions on how to socialise, we find it undeniable that it 
enriches our Theory of  Mind by providing us with previously unknown or more varied perspectives 
and mental states, an input that comes close to actual experience. There is an issue with too easily 
‘wearing’ fictional minds though, and that is the fact that although we are able to put ourselves 
inside the mind of  a fictional character, our Theory of  Mind can take this too far by allowing us to 
“speculate about their past, present, and future states of  mind, even as we realize that these ‘airy 
forms [and] phantoms of  imagination’ do not deserve such treatment” (Ibid.: Part 1, Section 4, Par. 
8), simply because they do not exist outside of  the narrative. Our Theory of  Mind is necessary for 
reading between the lines, when the author writes of  a nervous handshake or a quivering lip, and we 
as readers can figure out what emotions caused this physical reaction without the author having to 
spell it out for us. But our Theory of  Mind often fails to limit a fictional character’s range of  
emotions to the written text. 
	 Thinking this way creates the image of  one’s Theory of  Mind as a sort of  mental program, 
continuously scanning its surroundings for potential mental states to take in and interpret. It is 
structured to interpret real human beings’ mental states, but upon encountering a fictional character 
it often seems not to differentiate between the two. In Zunshine’s words: 
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[T]he cognitive mechanisms that evolved to process information about thoughts and feelings 
of  human beings are constantly on the alert, checking out their environment for cues that fit 
their input conditions. On some level, then, works of  fiction manage to ‘cheat’ these 
mechanisms into ‘believing’ that they are in the presence of  material that they were 
‘designed’ to process, that is, that they are in the presence of  agents endowed with a 
potential for a rich array of  intentional stances. (Zunshine, 2012: Part 1, Section 2, Par. 4) 
We can picture a mind that ceaselessly collects new working material, its satisfaction growing with 
the amount of  mental states accumulated and deciphered, as becomes manifest in our own joy at 
unraveling the more convoluted parts of  the plot and thus understanding the narrative in all its 
complexities. As mentioned earlier, this cuts both ways: 
	  
[...] we may see the pleasure afforded by fictional narratives as grounded in our awareness of  
the successful testing of  our mind-reading adaptations [...] - [...] however, we have to 
remember that the joys of  reading fictional minds are subject to some of  the same 
instabilities that render our real-life mind-reading both exciting and exasperating. (Zunshine, 
2012: Part 1, Section 4, Par. 11) 
This twofold emotion we feel when confronted with complex narratives both in real life and in 
fictional narratives becomes particularly apparent when trying to decipher statements that involve 
higher orders of  intentionality. 
We remind the reader of  George’s unexpected promotion. Imagine George and Jane inviting 
their boss Sara and her husband Dave over for dinner, to celebrate the occasion. Jane sees Sara 
laugh wholeheartedly at George’s joke and stroking his hand amicably, upon which George flashes 
an apologetic smile towards Jane. 
	 Why does Jane suddenly seem distant and cold towards George and hostile towards Sara? 
Jane recognises that Sara does not care that Jane realises that George does not want that Jane finds out 
that George knows that Sara desires George. Dave is completely oblivious. 
Now what looked to involve only a simple dinner turned out to be a much more complicated mess. 
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  When grappling with this many levels of  intentionality, our ToM does get enjoyably 
challenged by the task but at the same time overstrained by the complexity of  it. Thus we sway 
between engagement and amusement on the one hand and puzzlement and a mental overload on 
the other. Writing this type of  sentence, however, becomes even more complex as the writer must 
consider the reader as a level of  intentionality themselves. In any case, anybody having succeeded in 
unraveling our convoluted example, has exceeded the average capacity human beings are shown to 
have for levels of  intentionality. Of  course, in principle additional levels could be added infinitely, 
but “our cognitive architecture may discourage the proliferation of  cultural narratives that involve 
“infinite” levels of  intentionality” (Ibid.: Part 1, Section 6, Par. 3). As Robin Dunbar reported 
through his studies, in unraveling nested sentences, 
Error rates on the mind-reading tasks were similar (5-10%) up to and including fourth-order 
intentionality, but rose dramatically to nearly 60% on fifth-order tasks. Apparently, subjects 
found anything above fourth-order ('Simon believes that Peter supposes that Simon thinks 
that Peter wants . . .') extremely difficult to do. (Dunbar, 2000: 241) 
This is true in any format, but the average person has a much more difficult time grappling with 
multiple levels of  intentionality when it is presented orally.  
It appears that a written culture is, on the whole, more able than is an oral culture to support 
the elaborately nested intentionality simply because a paragraph with eight levels of  
intentional embedment does not yield itself  easily to memorization and subsequent oral 
transmission. (Zunshine, 2012: Part 1, Section 7, Par. 7) 
By fixing the narrative in time and visualising it in print, fiction allows us to grapple with and solve 
constructions that would otherwise get lost in complication. Concerning Theory of  Mind, fiction 
then challenges us in ways that our everyday interactions, that is our ‘real life’, cannot – ideally 
generating both a learning effect and pleasure in the process. But as mentioned earlier, the writer 
invests into creating the narrative too, and thereby engages his ToM in similar, if  not more 
pronounced ways. In fact, it can be argued that using ToM lies at the heart of  the writing process, 
not only in enabling the author to produce fiction, but also in being one of  the main sources of  
pleasure while doing so: “P.G. Wodehouse insisted that authors conjure up fictional worlds precisely 
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for that kick of  creating, controlling, and inhibiting other people’s states of  mind” (Ibid.: 
Conclusion, Section 1, Par. 4).  
It may even be that the writer whose ToM is more actively involved in creating fiction than 
the reader’s mind in consuming it. The extra level of  intentionality involved and the fact that 
characters and a plot is created out of  ‘thin air’, out of  “[...] the cognitive workout of  constructing 
fictional minds” (Ibid.: Conclusion, Section 1, Par. 6) – these factors suggest that a written narrative 
comes to life not exclusively in the mind of  the reader but that actually, through creating fiction, 
“[...] a text ‘comes to life’ in the mind of  the author just as richly [...] because it engages her ToM in 
a unique and pleasurable (if  not at times torturous) manner (Ibid.: Conclusion, Section 1, Par. 7). 
This would imply that the author, being the source of  the narrative, is in control of  its 
unfolding and plays the more active part in engaging with the text. However, although the author 
initially constructs the fictional minds of  the characters she creates, it is ultimately the reader that, 
through interpretation, creates the final story as filtered through his or her Theory of  Mind.  
Every individual reader has their own last say on what the characters’ true intentions are and 
what the bigger picture of  the narrative amounts to. This of  course takes the narrative out of  the 
author’s realm of  influence as the reader is appropriating it. In this sense, invoking Judith Butler,  
‘[T]he birth of  the reader must be at the cost of  the death of  the Author,’ meaning that the 
reader, at liberty to choose whatever interpretation (or interpretations) of  the text strikes him 
or her as most compelling, assumes the position of  authority formerly reserved for the writer. 
(Zunshine, 2012: Part 2, Section 5, Par. 4) 
Thus the reader becomes a sort of  author himself, ‘writing’ new meaning into the story. This is 
made possible by the reader superimposing their own experience onto the narrative, investing it with 
personal meaning that originates from a connecting factor between the reader and the character. In 
the same way that one empathises and connects with someone in real life, the reader uses his or her 
own personal experience to relate to and understand a fictional character’s emotions. As the 
following passage illustrates, this is where fiction can play a vital role in the shaping and 
understanding of  the actual world around us: 
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Her personal feelings about [a] relative that she herself  feels very close to are made more 
poignant [...] because she is able to attribute a particular sentiment to a literary character; 
and [...] because she is titillated by the similarity between something that she has quietly felt 
for a long time and something that a highly sympathetic personage [...] is experiencing. She 
realizes that she is not alone in the wish that she used to consider odd, and her new awareness 
of  this fragile but comforting community is not reducible to the sum of  cognitions and emotions that went into 
it. (Zunshine, 2012: Conclusion, Section 2, Par. 8; emphasis added) 
This emphasises how the interaction between reader and fiction is a reciprocal one, where events in 
real life shape our perception of  literature and the literature in turn influences our views and 
opinions in our everyday lives.  
3.3.3 Closing Remarks 
	 To return to our point of  departure, the interdependent relationship between reading fiction 
and engaging in our social reality makes a significant contribution to how we make sense of  our 
world, regardless of  age. Where children benefit from reading in developing a Theory of  Mind, the 
road clearly does not end there; the effects of  reading are similarly beneficial for adults in bolstering 
the already existing skill set. From initially trying on mental states all the way to personally 
connecting with the fictional narrative we have explored the wide range of  advantages stemming 
from the seemingly simple act of  reading a book. And so, by stimulating and challenging our 
Theory of  Mind, fiction enriches our perspectives on life, thus making us more socially intelligent in 
the process: 
Theory of  Mind is a cluster of  cognitive adaptations that allows us to navigate our social 
world and also structures that world. Intensely social species that we are, we thus read fiction 
because it engages, in a variety of  particularly focused ways, our Theory of  Mind. 
(Zunshine, 2012: Conclusion, Section 2, Par. 1)  
3.4 F· R· I· E· N· D· S or foes? ToM in Popular Culture 
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In order to illustrate some of  the key concepts of  this paper we will now take a look at the episode 
“The One Where Everybody Finds Out” out of  season five of  the popular American sitcom 
“Friends”. We were inspired to do so by Lisa Zunshine and her book “Why We Read Fiction”, in 
which Zunshine briefly mentions the episode analytically through the lens of  ToM. We aimed to go 
deeper than Zunshine, and to bring Machiavellian Intelligence into the picture whilst doing so. 
Set in New York City, “Friends” follows an exemplary format centred around the 
dysfunctional relationships and zany experiences of  six caricatured twenty-somethings.  
“The One Where Everybody Finds Out” is currently the second-highest rated “Friends” 
episode of  all time on IMDb.com, and we argue that this is owed to the relative complexity of  the 
narrative: tvtropes.org calls this particular screenwriting trope at play “I Know You Know I Know”. 
It is regularly employed in numerous shows such as “Doctor Who”, “Star Trek: TNG” and 
“Sherlock” for both comic effect and to puzzle the omniscient viewer: 
Something of  an overblown version of  the classic chess axiom "think three moves ahead", 
this is one of  the most common sights in a duel of  ‘Chessmasters’ [...] May not feature the 
exact line, but often uses a scene where one character or the other remarks on how his 
opponent would react if  he knew, and what he's doing in case that happens. In real life, 
humans are capable of  keeping track of  many degrees of  what people know ("I know that he 
knows that she knows that they know that we know about the party..."), though even when 
taking the game seriously, they tend to find the string of  "knowing" comical. (tvtropes.org) 
While “Friends” cannot in good conscience be regarded as intellectual comedy, and most of  its gags 
are formulaic and depend on the studio audience reacting as prompted, this particular episode 
engages the viewer more than usual. We will now shortly summarise the episode’s content and 
proceed to analyse it in light of  our knowledge of  multi-layered representational mental states and MI. 
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3.4.1 The One Where Everybody Finds Out 
Ugly Naked Guy, the man living across the street from the clique, is moving out of  his apartment. 
Phoebe, Rachel and Ross go to a viewing of  the place since the latter wants to rent it to live closer to 
the rest. While Ross is inspecting the rest of  the apartment, Phoebe looks through the living room 
window and spots Monica and Chandler intimately engaged. It turns out that both Rachel and Joey 
are already privy to the two having an affair; Rachel and Phoebe, instead of  taking Joey's advice and 
admitting to Chandler and Monica that they know, decide to feign ignorance of  the situation for 
personal benefit and to make fun of  the pair. Phoebe then acts as if  she fancied Chandler and 
pretends to seduce him.  
Meanwhile, Ross realises that in order to get the apartment, he will need to beat fierce 
competition and tries to bribe the landlord (that is, Ugly Naked Guy), but he is obviously not the 
only one who utilises this strategy. His friends encourage him to bond with the landlord on a 
personal level, to "find out what he likes" and use it to gain his sympathy, which results in Ross 
getting naked with Ugly Naked Guy.  
Upon realising that the girls know of  their relationship, Chandler and Monica decide to 
keep up the appearances and mess with them instead – "the messers become the messees" (Chandler, 
10:40). Accordingly, Chandler invites Phoebe over for a date and they both continue the charade, 
trying to make the other back down. It is Chandler who eventually gives up and admits that he is in 
love with Monica, which takes the others by surprise, as they never thought Chandler and Monica’s 
fling was that serious. The pair asks Phoebe, Joey and Rachel not to tell Ross but he finds out 
anyway – the episode ends with him bursting with rage upon witnessing a sexual encounter between 
Chandler and Monica from his new apartment’s vantage point. 
3.4.2 Stacking Levels of  Intentionality  
The “I Know You Know I Know” trope mainly serves as a ploy to entertain the viewer but when 
analysed from a cognitive-psychological point of  view, it offers valuable insight into the workings of  
multi-layered intentional systems. The reason for this can be attributed to the self-referential and self-
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contained nature of  the universe in which the show takes place. With only six recurring characters 
and three main locations its scope is understandably small. In foregoing many real-life variables, 
such as the ambiguity of  relationships, sitcoms resemble a test environment, ready to be 
experimented in. At the end of  the day the slate is wiped clean, and rarely do strands of  story have 
repercussions for more than a few episodes. It is this reductionist derivate of  real life that lends itself  
neatly to both portraying complex social dynamics and in turn facilitating analysis thereof.  
	 (Phoebe 3:35) “They know you know and they don’t know Rachel knows” 
Early in the episode the situation presents itself  as follows. Rachel and Joey, who have been aware of  
Monica and Chandler’s affair for some time now, discuss with Phoebe their course of  action: how 
can the three take advantage of  their knowledge? – a question steeped in a Machiavellian sentiment. 
At this point the viewer knows that Phoebe knows that Monica and Chandler know that Joey knows, 
and at the same time, that Monica and Chandler do not know that Rachel knows. This covers four 
levels of  intentionality each.  
	 By way of  including the studio audience’s baffled laughter at the increasing absurdity of  the 
situation, the viewer is prompted to join in. Sitcoms especially leave no room for misinterpretation 
when it comes to inferring mental states of  the characters and what emotions arise from the 
interplay of  those mental states. The viewer is not only allowed to suspend his active role in the 
meaning-making process but indeed forced to align himself  with the pace and mood evoked by 
script, actors and studio audience. In other words, the various cues overwrite the viewer’s tendency 
to pass judgment independently, and consequently inhibit the employment of  his Theory of  Mind.  
	 (Monica, 10:40) “Unless… they don’t know that we know that they know” 
Later on, Monica and Chandler figure out that Rachel and Phoebe are onto them, because Phoebe 
is very obviously making advances towards Chandler in order to elicit a reaction confirming the 
affair. At this point the viewer knows that Monica and Chandler know that Phoebe and Rachel do 
not know that Monica and Chandler know that Phoebe and Rachel know. This covers five levels of  
intentionality.  
The increasing complexity of  the story adds an extra dimension to the show that usually 
stays on an easily digested level, as described above. Even though situational prompts are an integral 
part of  every episode of  “Friends”, specifically this one stimulates the viewer’s cognitive faculties to a 
greater extent, since he has to constantly reaffirm each of  the characters’ states of  knowledge. 
Furthermore, this episode stands out in that all six characters are involved in one plot, as opposed to 
the usual pairing of  characters in different parallel plot lines that have little impact on each other. 
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We attribute the episode’s popularity to the convergence of  each of  the character’s traits and mental 
states in a single convoluted situation that is constantly updated, echoing the findings of  our chapter 
“ToM and Fiction”, since one of  the main reasons to engage with fictional narratives is challenging 
our cognitive faculties.  
	 (Rachel, 13:18) “They know that we know they know we know” 
In a last twist, Rachel and Phoebe realise that Monica and Chandler are onto them and are trying 
to fool them in turn by playing along and thus shaking Phoebe’s confidence in seducing Chandler. 
At this point the viewer knows that Phoebe and Rachel know that Monica and Chandler know that 
Phoebe and Rachel know that Monica and Chandler know that Phoebe and Rachel know. This 
covers six levels of  intentionality. 
	 As touched on earlier in “Engaging and Refining ToM”, roughly here a critical point is 
reached, where the convoluted narrative starts to have ambivalent effects. To a certain extent the 
viewer’s mind is engaged by the repeated stacking of  mental states. However, this carries with it a 
risk of  overstraining our mental capacities, resulting in frustration and refusal to invest more thought 
into the situation. There is a fine line between challenging the viewer and putting them off  
completely. The unwillingness to mentalise beyond a particular point manifests itself  in Joey’s 
reluctance to partake in the ‘mind games’. As the designated ‘simpleton’ of  the show, Joey finds it 
exceedingly difficult to keep up pretence and not disclose secrets. He wishes for nothing more than 
to remove himself  from the scheming and for everything to go back to base level, where low-order 
intentionality predominates interaction. In everyday life, we share Joey’s attitude to some extent: 
considering multiple, nested abstractions of  others’ mental states puts a sizeable strain on our minds. 
Analogue to the law of  diminishing returns, expending increasing amounts of  ‘cognitive energy’ is 
detrimental over longer periods of  time: the more effort is put in, the smaller the rewards become in 
comparison. As the episode shows, overcomplicating matters forces the characters to adapt 
behaviour that runs contrary to their dispositions, resulting in an uncomfortable stalemate. Keeping 
things simple does not always imply lower intelligence but, on the contrary, is often the more feasible 
course of  action.  
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3.4.3 Machiavellian Intelligence Among Friends 
The episode “The One Where Everybody Finds Out” depicts several instances of  characters 
demonstrating MI. In the most poignant example, Joey is presented as having the same priorities 
and fundamental desires as the apes and monkeys observed in the earlier discussed “Machiavellian 
Intelligence” books, namely food and sex. In this scene Rachel gives advice to Ross in regards to 
how he might best secure the apartment he desires, as there is hot competition amongst the 
candidates for subleter. She affirms that Ross needs to find something to bond with the landlord 
over, so that he can win his favour and with it the apartment.  
You know what you should do, you should find out what his hobbies are and use that to 
bond with him. Yeah. Like if  I wanted something from Joey, I would strike up a conversation 
about, say, uhm, sandwiches, or, uh, or my underwear. (Rachel, 11:15) 
Joey agrees that this would be an effective means of  engaging him on his level, which could result in 
winning favour from him. Ross then realises that the most obvious thing to use as a point of  
connection with the landlord is nakedness, as the friend group are used to having seen him routinely 
roam around his apartment in the nude. For this reason they give him the nickname “Ugly Naked 
Guy”. We shall leave the nakedness and the naked guy now and return to it shortly. 
 This suggestion from Rachel seems to strike a queer resemblance with a scenario involving 
macaques (common Old World Monkeys) outlined in the book “Machiavellian Intelligence II” in 
the essay by Marina Cords entitled “Friendships, alliances, reciprocity and repair”. 
In a recent experimental study [of  macaques], Hemelrijk (1994) directly measured the 
likelihood of  supporting as a function of  the receipt of  prior grooming. [...]  Females 
supported others more often after being groomed by them than when no grooming had 
occurred. [...] These results suggest quite strongly that grooming is related to the receipt of  
support. (Cords, 1997: 38) 
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From this quote the reader can visualise a scenario in which one party is being given something with 
the knowledge that favours are often returned. The first macaque (i.e. the male grooming macaque) 
performs a seemingly selfless action for the benefit of  the second macaque (the female groomed 
macaque). However, the first macaque is looking to the future, so to speak, trying to win favour from 
the second macaque and thus benefits as well from the act of  grooming, perhaps more so than the 
second macaque. This benefit for the first macaque, this ulterior motive, is kept secret from the 
second macaque in order to improve the chances of  the first macaque enjoying the desired results 
from the action. The situation differs from an example of  the colloquialism, ‘You scratch my back, 
I’ll scratch yours’ as the actions of  the first macaque are imbued with an element of  deceit, and 
manipulate the outcomes rather than cooperatively build toward them with the second macaque.  
To take us back to the world of  “Friends”, we can replace the first macaque with Rachel and 
the second macaque with Joey, whilst transforming the physical act of  grooming with the figurative 
act of  grooming in the form of  striking up conversation about sandwiches - something Joey is fond 
of.  
Alternatively, we could replace the first macaque with Ross and the second macaque with 
Ugly Naked Guy. Ross’ first tactic for the ‘grooming’ of  Ugly Naked Guy is buying him a gift. He is 
proud of  his cunning, boasting to his friends, “I’ve got the edge [over the other potential tenants]. I 
know it’s not exactly ethical but I sent him [Ugly Naked Guy] a little bribe to tip the scales in my 
direction.” (Ross 8:11). The “bribe” turns out to be a small basket of  “mini-muffins”. When the 
group look into Ugly Naked Guy’s apartment, however, they see that the apartment is filled with 
gifts from potential tenants, including a pinball machine, a mountain bike and other, more 
spectacular baskets of  mini-muffins. 
Ross now acts according to Rachel’s advice - he grooms by using Ugly Naked Guy’s interest 
as the ‘back scratcher’. But Ross does not strike up a conversation with Ugly Naked Guy about 
sandwiches, as would be appropriate if  Ross were trying to groom Joey. Instead, Ross goes over to 
Ugly Naked Guy’s apartment and strikes up a conversation with him about nakedness, saying 
ingratiatingly, “I’m sorry, I can’t help but notice that you’re naked. [whilst clapping] I applaud you. 
Man, I wish I was naked” (Ross 13:40). 
As stated in the summary at the beginning of  this sub-chapter, Ross in turn gets naked with 
Ugly Naked Guy, which proves an effective tactic to win his favour and secure the apartment; a 
textbook example of  Machiavellian Intelligence in the form of  disingenuous manipulation. 
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3.4.4 Closing Remarks 
In conclusion, it is clear that the characters in this specific episode of  “Friends” are exercising their 
ToM to a high degree throughout the episode. The viewer is forced to do the same in order to 
untangle the confusion and thereby enjoy the show. As has been investigated in the Machiavellian 
Intelligence chapter of  this project, MI is often a by-product or extension of  ToM, as “The One 
Where They All Find Out” exemplifies. It is interesting to watch a television show from the 
perspective of  ToM or conscious of  the scientific phenomena, and as Zunshine illustrates, this 
episode of  “Friends” is by no means the only media within pop culture where this is possible.  
"75
House 3.1.1, Group 2 Spring 2015
3.5 Mindrobots – An Alternative View on Human Consciousness 
Writing this paper, we set out to show the importance of  considering psychological phenomena 
related to, but not necessarily included in, the ‘original’ conceptualisation of  ToM, especially within 
an adult, social context. To accept this ‘extended’ Theory of  Mind, however, we feel it is important 
to consider the following. Where cognitive and social psychology fail to sufficiently map out the 
human mind we can lean on another field of  study to buttress our understanding: the philosophy of  
mind.  
3.5.1 Introducing Dennett’s Philosophy of  Mind 
The psychological theories we have introduced in our paper take up the challenge of  explaining the 
workings of  the human mind in scientific terms. It all seems quite sound and reassuring – the brain 
is a physical entity which exhibits physical properties, with domain specific areas responsible for 
mentalising [comp: modulation theory] and it is seems to be only a matter of  time until scientists 
unravel the exact neurological processes that control all the mental events taking place in our heads, 
as the recent discovery of  mirror neurons points towards. Job well done, the task of  the scientist is 
completed. 
There are some concepts, however, that brain science and cognitive psychology take as 
axiomatic: mind, belief, mental state, to name a few. Although science – in its tendency to define 
concretely – has tried to explain seemingly non-physical phenomena, more and more questions keep 
emerging. A fine example of  this problem is the grandmother neuron theory. 
The grandmother neuron theory claims that every concept – for example the idea of  a 
grandmother – has a mental representation in every individual’s mind, with its physical counterpart 
in the brain. The theory then implies that if  a person loses this physical element, they would lose the 
idea it corresponds to. In other words, if  George loses the grandmother neuron, he will be unable to 
‘think’ about a grandmother at all (Dennett, 1979: xiii). 
This theory is obviously flawed: neurons, as well as other cells, end their lives –  either in 
necrosis or apoptosis – and yet it does not result in any cognitive blindness of  our perception. 
Although the theory has been deemed inaccurate, it poses an intriguing question – how is it that we 
have mental imagery and how is the mental related to the brain?  
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This is where philosophy comes into play. As Daniel C. Dennett states, 
Philosophy of  mind is unavoidable. As soon as one asserts anything substantive about 
anything mental, one ipso facto answers at least by implication one or more of  the 
traditional questions and thus places oneself  in the camp of  an ism (Dennett, 1979: xiv). 
Dennett postulates that any philosophical theory of  the mind should provide (or at least attempt to 
provide) answers to the basic, general questions about the mind: do we have minds? Are they the 
same as brains? What happens in there? On what grounds can we know anything about minds? 
Philosophy of  the mind does not try to contradict the scientific findings in that field, but it does 
provide grounds for conjecture about the metaphysical that science unavoidably has to make, but 
cannot justify. Where ToM research is built on assumptions about the existence of  agency, 
philosophy of  the mind acknowledges the speculative nature of  those assumptions and through 
reasoning validates what is scientifically not quantifiable. 
Philosophical theories then are very different to scientific theories. One might rather call 
them hypotheses, since they are highly self-referential and they do not necessarily lead to definite 
conclusions. Most of  the theories have counter theories, since for almost every philosopher's claim 
there is another philosopher eager to contradict it. 
There are two main trains of  thought in philosophy of  mind, on the bases of  which the 
differing theories are constructed. One is physicalism, which considers minds as nothing else than 
brains; all mental processes are physical processes and there is no non-physical component that 
makes our minds tick. The other approach is dualism, according to which there is more to minds 
than brains; they are a compound of  two ingredients, a physical brain and a non-physical 
‘something’.  
3.5.2 From “Brainstorms” to the Intentional System 
Although some philosophers consider dualism a valid and legitimate standpoint, Dennett himself  
values it as much as alchemy and astrology (Dennett, 1996: 24). In the introduction to 
“Brainstorms” (1979) he outlines several theories within the frame of  physicalism in order to 
propose his own theory that he calls, however reluctantly (since he is not satisfied with the frames 
any name would force his theory into), type intentionalism. Following Dennett, we will shortly introduce 
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two approaches to physicalism, as a contrasting background to Dennett's views: type identity theory and 
(Turing machine) functionalism. These theories search for answers to two main questions, namely 
“what are mental events?” 
and following this 
“what do two individuals have in common when they [share a mental event]?” (Dennett, 
1979: xiv) 
Both theories deny dualism, therefore they answer the first question quite similarly: mental events 
are physical events or have corresponding physical counterparts in the brain. The second question 
appears to be more problematic. One may say that it paraphrases Socrates' question "what is shared 
by things called by the same name?" and hundreds of  years later it still remains a subject of  
disputes. Type identity theory claims that two individuals who share a mental event must also exhibit 
physical similarities in the brain and what is more, that there exist particular physical events 
corresponding to every type of  mental event. Dennett then evokes Turing machine functionalism, but as 
technology has evolved since "Brainstorms" was first published, we will illustrate the theory by 
comparing human minds to software instead of  Turing machines. Functionalism reduces mental 
predicates to computer predicates, which means that for every mental event exhibited by two 
individuals there is a ‘functional’ condition that they both are subject to and that is expressible in a 
physically neutral, functional language. To put it differently, we can liken humans to machines and 
the processes in the mind are expressed in a programming language that we all share. 
For Dennett these two answers go too far. If  commonalities can be explained by physical 
similarities, then why do various time measuring devices go by the name ‘clock’ or ‘watch’, 
regardless of  their physical constitution and appearance? The functional approach provides an 
answer to this dilemma, but if  there are no solid grounds to believe that we share any physical or 
chemical features while sharing mental events, there is no guarantee that all humans share the same 
‘program’ that would allow to express mental predicates in a common language. 
Dennett presents a third view on the matter, a view that can be considered a solution to the 
question of  commonalities of  human minds, but is only valid and sound if  legitimised by the notion 
of  an intentional system. According to his standpoint, which he calls token functionalism, 
while every mental event is indeed some physical event or other, and moreover some 
functional event or other […], mental events are not definable as Turing machine types. 
(Ibid.: xvii) 
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To validate the statement we do not need to reduce the ‘mentalistic’ language, but as the concept of  
Turing machines establishes an abstract framework for modelling computations, intentional systems 
serve to establish a set of  rules by which to interpret the mental predicates. Thus the syntax can be 
explained as follows: in order for x to believe p, we need to be able to attribute the belief  p to x, and 
we can only do it accurately if  x is an intentional system. 
Dennett then takes token functionalism a step further, adding the intentional factor to the 
definition and thus forming his theory: 
  
Every mental event is some functional, physical event or other, and the types are 
captured not by any reductionist language but by a regimentation of  the very terms we 
ordinarily use - we explain what beliefs are by systematizing the notion of  a believing-system, 
for instance. (Ibid.: xix) 
  
Mental states do not constitute good theoretical entities, since it is hard to scientifically define what a 
belief  or a desire is. But we still talk about those concepts in the ordinary sense, and what Dennett 
postulates here is that this is possible on the condition that one sees the mental states through the 
prism of  the system that has these mental states. 
3.5.3 Mindreading and Dennett 
Over the following pages we will focus on Dennett’s notion of  intentional systems and intentionality in 
order to give a different perspective on the broad concept of  mindreading. We remind the reader of  
Dennett’s contribution in writing his commentary “Belief  about Beliefs” to the Premack and 
Woodruff  study, which led others to devise the false-belief  task. Yet as a philosopher he fashioned his 
own conceptualisation of  ToM, to be regarded partly as a prerequisite and partly as an alternative 
to TT, ST and MT. A striking difference in methodology to the cognitive-psychological, empirical 
approach of  e.g. Wimmer and Perner becomes apparent, when reading his works such as “Kinds of  
Minds – Toward an Understanding of  Consciousness” (1996) and “The Intentional Stance” (1987), 
the latter of  which became the eponym for this line of  thinking. 
We want to make clear that Dennett’s conceptualisation does not exclude but rather 
supplements the three theories mentioned as all mindreading processes fundamentally rely on 
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ascribing intentionality. Where they do differ, however, is in their focus on the mechanism for 
producing inferences about other minds and not on the philosophical questions one has to ask when 
trying to make sense of  the human mind. As noted earlier, the three theories suppose preset modi 
operandi: mentalising via the “little scientist” analogy, the use of  mental simulation, and domain-
specific brain modules, respectively. Dennett, on the other hand, proposes the intentional stance: an 
attitude agents assume towards the world whenever they try to predict another’s actions. Taking the 
intentional stance implies mentalising by virtue of  itself.  
This attitude offers a more adaptive, situational approach, where the intentional stance is but 
one possibility of  viewing another person’s actions. To paraphrase Dennett, it is this stance that 
precedes what is known as folk psychology and that in order to mindread efficiently one has to 
acknowledge that this process takes place in a normative system of  rationalised behaviour. It follows 
that the successful application of  folk psychology is idealised and based on the premise of  everyone 
adhering to this normative system or framework. 
	 Dennett arrives at his concept using conceptual reasoning supported largely by thought 
experiments (Goldman, 2012: 8). To fully grasp this we will take a step back and follow Dennett in 
his examination of  the evolutionary development of  agency, which – as should become evident – is 
a necessary precondition to ToM or folk psychology. This also serves to illustrate his rather different, 
fundamental approach about how to reach conclusions about the human mind.  
3.5.4 “The Birth of  Agency” 
At a macromolecular level a virus’ genetic makeup is responsible for it reacting to external stimuli. A 
virus exists to serve arguably the most primordial ‘purpose’, namely to secure that its RNA is passed 
on to subsequent generations. In today’s increasingly technocratic society it can be understood as a 
“tiny robot” (Dennett, 1996: 20) whose self-replication constitutes a systematic program. To keep 
this program functioning when experiencing changes in conditions of  the environment surrounding 
the robot, it might even modify its operating system (the virus’ RNA) to take account of  those 
changes and act accordingly.  
	 This “macromolecular agency” is where Dennett sees the predecessor to intentionality, 
which in turn leads to human agency, meaning and consciousness. 
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Through the microscope of  molecular biology, we get to witness the birth of  agency, in the 
first macromolecules that have enough complexity to perform actions, instead of  just lying there 
having effects. Their agency is not fully fledged agency like ours. They know not what they 
do. We, in contrast, often know full well what we do. At our best—and at our worst—we 
human agents can perform intentional actions, after having deliberated consciously about 
the reasons for and against. Macromolecular agency is different; there are reasons for what 
macromolecules do, but the macromolecules are unaware of  those reasons. Their sort of  
agency is nevertheless the only possible ground from which the seeds of  our kind of  agency 
could grow. (Dennett, 1996: 20) 
Now, as certainly very complex biological organisms we humans nonetheless can be broken down 
into molecules, our brains derived from, yet a mere compound of  “tiny robots”. Together, these 
countless machines with their countless operating systems amount to a conscious, thinking, 
intentional mind. The how-and-why of  this has been one of  the defining questions of  philosophy 
since at least Descartes’ “Meditations on First Philosophy”. As Dennett states, a dualistic approach 
necessitates the ‘existence’ of  a “secret extra ingredient”, some “nonphysical and utterly mysterious 
stuff ”, a conceptualisation he promptly dismisses as unscientific and obsolete. In its stead he 
advocates hard science: evolution (Dennett, 1996: 24). 
	 Before the mind comes the body. Our ancestral “tiny robots” evolved from simple cells or 
prokaryotes to complex cells or eukaryotes, incorporating other organisms to aid in their survival 
and reproduction. Those slightly less tiny robots are capable of  running subroutines to repair, 
nourish and protect themselves. Here Dennett calls upon Aristotle who speaks of  the organisation, 
the efficient grouping and ordering of  programs as a nutritive soul. To continue the computer analogy 
on a complex, multicellular level, the nutritive soul acts as an OS mediating between hard- and 
software and interprets program-specific language. It is important to note that this self-regulative 
umbrella is arrived upon by way of  natural selection and “[is] composed, at bottom, of  lots of  tiny 
passive switches that can be turned ON or OFF by equally passive conditions that the organisms 
encounter in their wanderings” (Dennett, 1996:25). 
	 Just as relatively ancient systems such as our metabolism and immune system are made up of  
series- and parallel-connected ON/OFF-switches, so is our mind. These myriads of  switches can be 
seen as specialised, binary agents acting or refraining from acting depending on circumstance. 
Dennett chooses to call the systems in which they act intentional systems and “the perspective from 
which their agenthood [...] is made visible, the intentional stance” (Dennett, 1996: 26). 
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3.5.5 Taking Stances 
In “The Intentional Stance” Dennett juxtaposes the admittedly lofty concept of  the intentional stance 
with two other perspectives to interpret the external world: the so-called physical and design stances.  
The former marks the point of  view from which one predicts the behaviour of  objects or 
organisms according to the laws of  physics. As such, it is safe to say that a prediction about, for 
example, the trajectory of  a baseball thrown at various angles to the ground with varying velocities 
will be correct, if  one possesses sufficient knowledge of  Newtonian mechanics. As long as the laws 
of  physics hold up, assuming this stance yields a consistent success rate in predicting the behaviour 
of  systems – but this process can be laborious and slow, considering all variables and formulas 
involved. However, in many cases one does not necessarily need to have an extensive knowledge of  
the forces acting on a physical object to predict its behaviour. We adopt the physical stance even before 
we can speak or think about adopting stances towards anything. Before folk psychology, there is folk 
physics, which is a general term for the system of  expectations that humans have towards the 
environment. It, for instance, is not required to have any understanding of  thermodynamics to know 
not to touch a burning stove, nor is it essential to know the sum of  all the forces a car is subject to in 
order to stop it and avoid collision. These examples illustrate the acquired ability to predict (even 
subconsciously) a general behaviour of  objects, a ‘knowledge’ about the workings of   the world that 
comes with experience. But folk physics also includes another sort of  ‘expectation’ – the innate 
instincts that make a baby crawl towards a “visual cliff ” but not beyond it, even though it might not 
have learned from experience that crossing the edge means falling, which means hitting the ground, 
which means pain (Dennett, 1987:8). 
	 Another, more immediate position to assume is the design stance: in distinction to the physical 
stance one here does not have to understand or even know a system’s inner workings to make a 
prediction, since it is based on its purpose by design. Dennett again refers the reader to computers; 
most users will not have “the foggiest idea what physical principles are responsible for the 
computer’s highly reliable, and hence predictable, behaviour” (Dennett, 1987:17). Especially since 
the establishment of  GUI in consumer-grade products it does not take a tech-savvy user to install 
and run a new program – what operations are being executed is irrelevant to the user and barring 
malfunction she is able to predict the machine’s behaviour accurately. We depend on the design stance 
a lot in our daily lives: not everyone will be able to explain how a car works, how an alarm clock 
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knows to wake us at a predetermined point in time, why a faucet dispenses warm water, even why 
windows are transparent. And yet we know how to use all of  these things, and what is more, use 
them to our advantage. Assuming that systems behave in ways they are designed to do is a much 
quicker but ‘rougher’ process and requires unconscious but numerous leaps of  faith, as we on a 
regular basis trust our lives for example to combustible vehicles hurtling along at lethal speeds. In 
Dennett’s words, “[d]esign-stance prediction, when applicable, is a low-cost, low-risk shortcut, 
enabling [us] to finesse the tedious application of  [our] limited knowledge of  physics.” (Dennett, 
1996:29). 
	 The intentional stance comes into play when we attribute intentions to systems and can be 
understood as a “subspecies” of  the design stance. While mostly assumed to make sense of  humans’ 
intentions we can even – and one might agree are wont to – ascribe intentionality to inanimate 
objects. A favourite example of  Dennett’s is the chess-playing computer. From a design perspective a 
chess program is written in order to perform the moves that are likeliest to lead to defeating its 
opponent, but nothing is lost if  the human opponent ascribes the computer agency and the want to 
win. This form of  animism works well within the regulated ruleset of  chess, and has the benefit of  
making the computer more relatable. In accordance with the design stance one does not have to know 
anything about the way the chess program is composed as long as it is appreciated as a rational 
agent. The intentional stance proves another shortcut to predicting behaviour and often works whether 
a system actually possesses agency or not. Though it comes with the caveat of  possible false 
inferences about motives and behaviour in systems less clearly delineated than e.g. the rules of  chess. 
	 All organisms and synthetics, on a basic level, seek the best and optimal for themselves but 
how can we establish what is genuine goal-seeking and what is simply an automatic reaction to the 
environment with no ‘sentient’ thought behind it?  It seems contrived to assume the intentional stance 
towards systems that cannot malfunction – a pebble falling to the ground can hardly underperform 
and miss. A stream will flow from its spring to the lowest point in the terrain and thus succeed in its 
‘stream-ness’.  
The simple system of  a door on the other hand can jam and malfunction. To assume a 
physical stance entails realising that the net force of  our pushing and shoving is smaller than the 
friction acting against it; alternatively we can choose to disregard physics and just note that the door 
fails its designed purpose. But to assume the intentional stance and treat the door as a rational agent 
does not give us a better understanding of  the situation. Interestingly enough, language seems to 
reflect the human tendency to assume motives and reasons in line with our own when we complain 
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that the door does not want to open. This example serves to show that the lines between the different 
stances are often not precisely demarcated. 
To be able to predict the behaviour of  an intentional system adopting the intentional stance the first thing 
one needs to know is what the beliefs and desires of  that system are about.  
3.5.6 How Things are About Things 
In Dennett’s terms “[s]omething exhibits intentionality if  its competence is in some way about 
something else” (Dennett, 1996:35). “Intentionality” as well as “aboutness” are always aimed at 
something and if  we misinterpret the intentional object (the object of  our thought) we develop a 
mistaken concept and consequently direct wrong intentions towards it – mistaking a wax replica of  
a pear for an actual pear might lead to stomach problems.  
Secondly it is important to ask oneself  “how are [the beliefs and desires] about [this 
system]” (Dennett, 1996:41). By way of  introducing terminology commonly used in the fields of  
semiotics or logic Dennett makes it clear that in order to make correct assumptions about an 
intentional system one has to be aware of  the difference between extension and intension [sic]: The former 
encompasses everything a term or phrase applies to, whereas the latter describes the subtext or 
inflection of  a term or phrase. Consider this example: 
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The physical stance (PS) yields accurate predictions but requires 
advanced knowledge to explain an action (unless: folk physics); PS 
constitutes a high-cost, zero-risk assessment  
	 → gravity acting on pebble 
The design stance (DS) yields accurate predictions (unless: system 	
malfunction) based on designed behaviour, without having to understand 
underlying mechanics; DS constitutes a low-cost, low-risk assessment 
	 → human liver filtering toxins 
The intentional stance (IS) yields not always accurate predictions but 
makes very complex systems more relatable; IS constitutes a low-cost, 
higher-risk assessment 
	 → child crying because it does not want to go to bed yet 	 	
	 (but other reasons possible)	 	 	 	 	 [box8] 
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The leader of  the free world arrived in Moscow on June 8th 2010 
and  
	 The president of  the United States arrived in Moscow on June 8th 2010 
will carry different connotations to their readers. The extension of  those two statements is that one 
day Barack Obama came to visit Russia. On the other hand the two statements differ in their 
intension. Where the second assumes a decidedly neutral position the first seems to suggest 
superiority; pondering its intension we might infer that the utterer of  the statement exhibits a pro-
West, USA-centric view of  the world.  
Put another way, simple mathematical statements like 33 and 3x3x3 are referentially transparent, 
as is the job description “the president of  the United States” . But when we cannot freely 
interchange one statement with another without losing or imbuing subtext, this points to the fact 
that terms or statements often exhibit referential opacity. 
To sum up, it is of  importance when adopting the intentional stance to be conscious of  the fact 
that intentional systems can have varying intensions and in turn be referentially opaque – an exact prediction 
about the underlying cause and reasoning of  a certain intentional system will often remain wishful 
thinking. Thankfully, “[t]he intentional stance can usually tolerate a lot of  slack [...] since the task of  
expressing exactly how the agent conceives of  his task is misconceived, as pointless an exercise as 
reading poems in a book through a microscope” (Dennett, 1996:41). 
Coming back to the original question of  ‘how something is about something else’ we will now 
aim to shed light on Dennett’s conception of  representational mental states [comp: box2]. The basic 
form of  attributing mental states are statements that express propositional attitudes. In general terms 
these statements might look as follows: 
x believes that p. 
y desires that q. 
z wonders whether r.  
The letters x, y, z refer to the intentional system under examination. The content of  systems x, y, z is 
denoted by the letters p, q, r. And the attitude these systems exhibit to the contents in question is 
qualified by adjuncts such as believe, desire, wonder. 
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Propositions [...] are the theoretical entities with which we identify, or measure, beliefs. For 
two believers to share a belief  is, by definition, to believe in one and the same proposition. 
(Dennett, 1996:45) 
But does that sufficiently explain the intricacies of  language, e.g. when translated from one to 
another? One has to account for the fact that rephrasing a statement can tint its reception (as made 
clear by the example about Barack Obama) – “should propositions line up with ways of  saying or 
with things said?” (Dennett, 1996:46). A good exercise is to question whether proposition A (e.g. “the 
president of  the United States”) can be thought of  as true while believing that proposition B (e.g. “the 
leader of  the free world”) is false. If  yes, then those two constitute different propositions. 
3.5.7 Intrinsic and Derived Intentionality 
All of  the above serves an understanding of  the concepts Dennett presupposes when he outlines 
intrinsic and derived intentionality according to John Searle – intrinsic or original intentionality denotes the 
‘aboutness’ of  our thoughts whereas derived intentionality encompasses the ‘aboutness’ of  human 
artefacts like maps, books, words, paintings, etc. Their intentionality is derived from the original 
intentionality of  the human mind, or in Dennett’s own words, “[t]he derived intentionality of  our 
artifactual representations is parasitic on the genuine, original, intrinsic intentionality that lies 
behind their creation” (Dennett, 1996:50). 
	 To draw on an example, if  Searle were to describe George’s mental state when thinking 
about a platypus, the concept that forms in George’s head would show intrinsic intentionality. He in 
turn might make use of  this concept to deduce a representation of  his imaginary platypus and 
express it, for example, in the form of  a drawing or a written description of  its features, thereby 
creating an artefact. This artefact is derived from the original thought process and as such subject to 
interpretation: there is a point to be made about the linguistic conventions and mutual agreements 
within certain communities but nonetheless these “external representations get their meanings –
  their intensions and extensions –  from the meanings of  the internal, mental states and acts of  
people who make them and use them” (Dennett, 1996:51). We inadvertently colour our intrinsic 
beliefs, desires, intentions (in the original sense) when expressing them in some form.  
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Along the way some inflection might be lost, which can lead us to misinterpret meaning: deriving or 
‘extracting from thought’ the sentence “George struck Dave as a child” is ambiguous in the sense 
that it might refer either to George’s quite childish demeanour or be a simple statement about an 
event some decades back when George, upset that Dave took his favourite Tonka truck from him, 
lashed out and connected with his chin. How familiar we are with “[t]he system of  representation 
that is anchored to the minds of  the representers” determines which interpretation seems more 
likely (Dennett, 1996:51). As mentioned before, to adopt the intentional stance thus often requires a 
leap of  faith. 
To finally find an answer to the all-important question of  ‘how are mental states about 
things’, Dennett breaks with Searle’s established idea of  intrinsic intentionality – to paraphrase he 
deems it a fallacy to assume the human mind has anything but derived intentionality. This might come 
as a surprise. We will follow his line of  thought as he once again makes use of  an analogy regarding 
robots, for which the reason shall become clear shortly. 
A robot designed by its creators to assist in the menial task of  shopping groceries takes its 
instructions from a list with – to the human observer – cryptical content: 
MILK@.5×GAL if  P <2×QT\P else 2×MILK@QT  
To the automaton this states that it should buy half  a gallon of  milk, “but only if  the price of  a half  
gallon of  milk is less than twice the price of  a quart.” (Dennett, 1996:53). Now, that the translation 
into English is derived from the “gibberish” above is evident. The crux lies in recognising the fact that 
the original instruction also constitutes derived intentionality. But did we not just state that any derived 
meaning stems from an original or intrinsic intentionality? According to Dennett the robot’s CPU is but 
an artefact of  the engineers, the designers behind its creation. But instead of  giving the robot 
detailed instructions about different cost-saving scenarios the robot’s creators left it with a general 
directive of  “try and save money if  you can, alright, buddy?” A complex AI such as the robot’s will 
assess and adapt to circumstance, tweak its behavioural routines in accordance. After a while the 
creators might even fail to recognise their programming as their creation becomes increasingly more 
sophisticated –  and the creation on the other hand will swear to be the original author of  its 
behaviour; herein lies the illusion of  intrinsic mental states.  
"87
House 3.1.1, Group 2 Spring 2015
3.5.8 Closing Remarks 
It is a matter of  fact that ‘Mother Nature’ is George’s creator, he himself  simply a composite of  
countless binary agents, of  “tiny robots”, a product of  evolution via natural selection spanning 
hundreds of  thousands of  years. There is nothing intrinsic about George’s mind. We as humans have 
simply evolved beyond the point of  being able to fully comprehend ourselves. Ironically it took our 
reaching this unprecedented evolutionary height in order to develop the desire to comprehend 
ourselves in the first place.  
Over the last couple of  thousand years we have been playing catch-up with our innate 
complexity, arriving at conclusions mostly through reasoning and philosophical musings, and lately 
through the relatively recent field of  psychology. The human psyche remains the ultimate 
conundrum, and there are manifold ways to make sense of  it. Dennett offers us one way, and being 
of  philosophical nature, it remains hypothetical for the moment. However, its intricate rational 
structure and its highly compelling inferences for our understanding of  the workings of  our mind - 
make it a valuable and even convincing conceptualisation of  the human psyche. 
We are descended from robots, and composed of  robots, and all the intentionality we enjoy 
is derived from the more fundamental intentionality of  these billions of  crude intentional 
systems. (Dennett, 1996: 55) 
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4. Discussion 
One might say that we began our “discussion” of  some of  the themes from this project in the 
“Friends” chapter. Here we applied the knowledge gained in the introductory chapter, the Why We 
Read Fiction chapter, the Machiavellian Intelligence chapter and our general project research.  
	 As was the case in the “Friends” chapter, we now wish to discuss our project, ToM and the 
related themes we have explored with less recourse to the literature, and more use of  our own 
thought. This will also allow us to take a deeper look at the connections between the various 
phenomena. To start with we offer some further insight into the methodology used in this paper. 
4.1 George and Jane: Methodology Personified 
Over the course of  this paper we have acquainted the reader with two fictional characters named 
George and Jane. Our reasoning for this is twofold. Primarily this serves to strike a balance between 
the at times challenging technical jargon and more engaging examples, to complement academic 
phrasing with a more relatable diction. Consequently, George and Jane help create a vivid and 
dynamic imagery. 
But in another sense this stylistic device also exemplifies notions put forth by especially, but 
not limited to, Lisa Zunshine in “Why We Read Fiction”: by incorporating a fictional narrative into 
the paper, the reader does not only get exposed to new factual information but also to invented 
mental states and a suggestive storyline that stimulates and challenges his or her Theory of  Mind. 
Strictly speaking, George and Jane are confined to the scenes we described, but they become more 
than mere stand-ins, as they continue to exist in the reader’s mind and constitute a tool to help the 
reader understand concepts without their explicit mentioning, even serving as a mnemonic device. 
To invest one’s mindset in the reading makes for a more reciprocal relationship between reader and 
text, which through ‘dialogue’ promotes anchoring the knowledge presented in a lasting fashion. 
	 In the end, successfully applying Theory of  Mind to the narrative fragments yields a 
conclusion that goes beyond the explicitly stated. To qualify this claim, we will quickly recapitulate 
what has happened between the two characters. 
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An astute reader will at this point remark, “I knew it all along!” We caution, however, not to fall prey 
to hindsight bias (which, nota bene, must have been Jane’s reaction on discovering her husband’s 
infidelity). 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In chronological order the reader finds out that:  
 	 * George and Jane are married 
	 * George stays late after work 
	 * George wants a promotion and needs money 
	 * Jane finds out about George’s financial woes 
	 * George and Jane work together; their boss Sara promotes 
	    George unexpectedly 
What Jane realises at the dinner when she puts the facts together, is 
that George has been sleeping with their boss Sara to secure for 
himself a promotion and thus alleviate his money problems. To 
understand the reasoning process that leads Jane to her realisation, 
the levels of intentionality involved are added in consecutive order:  
	 Sara desires1 George 
	 	 →George knows2 that Sara desires1 George 
    	 	 [...] 
	 	 	 →Jane recognises7 that Sara does not care6 that 
	 	 	 Jane realises5 that George does not want4 that 
	 	 	 Jane finds3 out that George knows2 that Sara 	
	 	 	 desires1 George  
As explored earlier, the reader herself presents another level of 
intentionality, as do the authors: 
	 → The reader understands8 that Jane recognises7 that Sara 	
	 does not care6 that Jane realises5 that George does not want4 
	 that Jane finds3 out that George knows2 that Sara desires1 	
	 George 
	 	 →We wanted9 the reader to understand8 that Jane 	
	 	 recognises7 that Sara does not care6 that Jane realises5 
	 	 that George does not want4that Jane finds3 out that 	
	 	 George knows2 that Sara desires1 George 	 [box9]
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4.2 Deontic Reasoning as Prerequisite to Pluralistic Ignorance 
Being inherently linked to norms and the impact of  social contexts on individual behaviour, both 
pluralistic ignorance and deontic reasoning deal with the outside factors influencing the individual 
cognitive processes involved in applying ToM. To expand on the classroom setting outlined earlier, 
an incorporation of  DR can further enhance our understanding of  the situation.  
	 As mentioned with regards to PI, the collective silence of  the group of  students is based on a 
misattribution of  beliefs, or more accurately in this case, states of  knowledge to the rest of  the class. 
But keeping quiet in this circumstance is a behaviour that cannot exclusively be ascribed to the 
inaction of  others in this specific situation. We already argued that the main inhibitory factor is the 
feeling of  being the only one not understanding something, while thinking everyone else knows 
perfectly well what is being talked about. This can only be a limiting factor to our behaviour, if  we 
have a conception that admitting incomprehension is an embarrassing act in exposing us as 
comparatively ‘stupid’ to the rest. This then points to the fact that more general constraints underlie 
a failure to speak up, constraints that are present in the shape of  classroom regulations and 
implicitly stated norms.  
In a lecture the role allocation is quite clear, with the professor being expected to talk and the 
students to listen. There are clear obligations connected to this arrangement, such as not to talk with 
the person next to oneself  or not to interrupt the speaker. Only in special circumstances do these 
obligations get lifted and the students have permission to assume an active role; for example when 
asking a question about the content or the teacher in turn asking the students to answer a question 
or to discuss it amongst them. While the latter exception is cued by the person of  authority whose 
explicit permission socially facilitates action of  the students, the former demands an individual’s 
initiative to demand specification or repetition of  a certain part. Here, returning to our terminology 
from the chapter on DR, the mentalistic force has to exceed the normative force, that is, the desire to 
clarify something has to be greater than the perceived necessity to comply with the expected 
behaviour.  
In a situation where PI is present, deontic reasoning is then the main reason for us to feel the 
restrictions that prevent action. Here an objection might be raised in that this would contradict our 
previous finding that PI originates mainly from a flawed use of  ToM. Quite the opposite is the case 
though. As we have established that DR is fundamental to any process of  mentalising, its inclusion 
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in explaining PI does not render obsolete our earlier assessment, but rather supplements it. Where 
ToM helps us understand how one’s look at every other person’s cognitive process influences our 
perception of  the situation, DR sheds light on the impact of  the largely intangible societal forces 
that constitute our behaviour.  
4.3 Another Look into Autism: Grandin’s Deontic Reasoning 
In our efforts to shift our focus away from the more traditional studies previously done on Theory of  
Mind, we deliberately avoided delving into developmental studies conducted on autism. While 
mentioning Temple Grandin and her spectacular case, along with Baron-Cohen and his studies of  
autism, we merely skimmed the surface of  the many aspects of  the neuro-developmental disorder. 
But our explorations could have gone much further seeing as it is a massive field in and of  itself.  
Having already explored the mental world without ToM that autistic individuals inhabit, we 
found that we could use this discussion space to further explore other aspects such as an autist’s lack 
of  deontic reasoning. As mentioned in our paper, Wellman and Miller argue that ToM is fundamental 
to DR, and vice versa, but does it go without saying that autistic individuals without ToM also lack 
DR? In the specific case of  Temple Grandin, it proves insightful to study her more off-kilter social 
interactions. For example, the way that she interacts with interviewers seems rude and thoughtless. 
She interrupts others before they are done asking a question; generally speaking, when asked a 
question we we might correctly guess at its content before the other has finished to speak, but we 
resist the urge to interrupt in light of  obligations set in place by social norms. 
Sacks briefly wrote about Grandin’s lack of  social niceties, about how her inability to feel 
embarrassed allowed her to act in ways that normative forces would have restrained in someone 
without autism. She does not participate in small talk, not understanding the social obligations one 
may normally feel. Offering someone coffee, when they arrive at your office, or asking how their trip 
was – these seemingly arbitrary components of  conversations are contextually prompted, a fact that 
escapes Grandin. It would be interesting to research further into how a lack of  DR skews an autist’s 
world and in turn, how our DR skews our image of  autistic individuals. An anecdote about 
Grandin’s oftentimes strange behaviour depicts how, in trying to understand how cattle felt while in 
the corral before being herded off  to be slaughtered, Grandin laid down in the middle of  the cow 
corral. For the bystanders that seemed like a very bizarre thing to do, seeing as it did not abide by 
permissions granted within that social context. To others this made Grandin appear very odd, while 
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to her, not including deontic concerns in her reasoning, it seemed sensible to try and perceive things 
from the cattle’s point of  view.  
	 Someone without autism would make an effort to comply to whatever social norms were 
present in a given situation. Grandin, on the other hand, is aware of  her lacking Theory of  Mind, 
and compensates by constructing her own ToM through analysing social situations. She can 
understand the restraining force that others are susceptible to within social contexts in retrospect 
and thus try and modulate her behaviour, but she lacks the actual mechanism of  restraint in 
moments when it could be necessary. 
4.4 Suggestions for Further Philosophical Enquiries 
In writing about philosophy of  mind as both an alternate and supplementary understanding of  
mentalising processes we have chosen to follow Daniel Dennett’s exploration of  the evolution of  
agency and his subsequent coining of  the term intentional stance. Dennett as a cognitive scientist and 
philosopher has proven influential in shaping Theory of  Mind understandings and research. In a 
future paper we can easily envision to juxtapose his critical views on the contemporary 
understanding of  qualia (for example, as outlined in his 1988 book “Quining Qualia”) with the views 
of  some proponents of  this conception within philosophy of  mind, such as Frank Jackson. To 
integrate a cognitive-scientific perspective of  ‘how we think about things’ within the arguments for 
or against qualia seems to be a worthwhile and topically relevant undertaking. 
	 But why stop there? If  one were to invest in another project with a bigger focus on the 
philosophical implications of  Theory of  Mind, a wider historical scope would surely be beneficial to 
one’s understanding of  how Dennett arrives at his conclusions. In the paper we shortly outline his 
views on functionalism and type identity theory. A valuable historical perspective could be gained by 
analysing the origins of  dualism (possibly drawing on René Descartes’ examination of  a mind-body 
dichotomy in “Meditations on First Philosophy”) and contrasting it with physicalist views. To go back 
even further in time might entail an interesting examination of  the origins of  idealism: a position 
grounded in the idea that ‘reality as we know it’ is a mental construct. What does Plato have to offer 
us in this regard? How does this reflect ancient Greek society at the time? This would furthermore 
open up the possibility of  branching out into eastern philosophical schools of  thought, such as 
Hindu idealism central to the Vedanta. On that note, religious scripture in general, both western and 
eastern, offers fascinating insights into the human mind in light of  historical context.  
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In comparison to the longstanding philosophical tradition, modern psychology is still in its 
infancy: as a brainchild of  the twentieth century this field of  study is very much informed by the 
historical and cultural context within which it originated, and as such there seems to be a trend to 
scientifically document and qualify what traditionally was firmly anchored in the realm of  
philosophy. If  philosophy has paved the way for psychology, then retracing theories and thought 
processes to us seems essential? to filling in the blanks in an extended Theory of  Mind. 
In short, an extensive analysis of  the history of  philosophy of  mind would serve to further 
bolster the findings of  this paper. ‘Thinking about how we think’ is an integral part of  the human 
condition and has been for millennia. Current research into Theory of  Mind represents only the 
proverbial ‘tip of  the iceberg’ of  how to make sense of  humanity’s most elusive enigma: the self. 
4.5 Interconnectivity of  ToM-related Concepts: A Case Study 
There is clearly an interconnectivity or room for interplay between the various phenomena relating 
to Theory of  Mind. This has wide applications in various academic areas, as well as everyday 
human life, as our project illustrates and we will further explain here.  
We would now like to explore the potential for analysing a case from modern history such as 
the Holocaust, viewing this catastrophic event as a number of  psychological phenomena occurring 
simultaneously or leading fluidly into one another. This could be the topic of  a future or follow-up 
paper: examining the Holocaust through the lens of  ToM. The related phenomena of  deontic 
reasoning, pluralistic ignorance, Machiavellian Intelligence and hindsight bias would be particularly 
pertinent to this project, as well as a more general understanding of  ToM. 
	 A theme like this would require heavy research, but here and now we can give a blueprint for 
the trajectory of  the project.  
	 We would begin with the astonishing rise of  Hitler to becoming Chancellor and Führer of  
Germany, as well as the development of  the National-Socialist party from a small, little known party 
to the achievement of  national and transeuropean governance. It seems logical that Hitler would 
have to have applied Machiavellian Intelligence in order to skilfully work himself  to the top of  the 
German political echelons. This would not have been possible without Hitler’s personal disposition, 
and it seems plausible that he would have scored high on the Mach IV scale according to “narrow 
Machiavellianism”. But perhaps deconstructing Hitler’s personality from a ‘broad Machiavellianism’ 
perspective would be more pertinent, as Hitler did exhibit moments of  tenderness or humanness in 
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his life external to fascist, nationalist politics. Examples of  this side to his personality can be seen in 
his passion for painting, love of  dogs and romantic relationship with Eva Braun. This would imply 
that Hitler implemented MI as and when necessary, as Whiten and Byrne describe the 
phenomenon, and that it was not an ever-present part of  his personality as a High-mach, as Geis, 
Christie and Lyons et al. would probably claim. In any case, as a charismatic speaker, unhesitant of  
playing on people’s emotions and using others to achieve his goals, he made perfect material for a 
leader.  
	 Though he might have seemed promising prior to or at the beginning of  his leadership, it 
seems highly unlikely that individual German citizens would not have questioned the policies of  
their government at later points in time – in their mass persecution, imprisonment and liquidation 
of  fellow citizens; their ruthlessness; and their aggressive, antagonistic war tactics. However, one 
could argue that due to a combination of  deontic reasoning and Pluralistic ignorance, people did not 
express their true feelings about the regime and the dire situation. People may have perceived those 
around them as being submissive and seemingly supportive of  the atrocities caused by Nazi 
apparatus, and therefore assumed that their thoughts did not represent the majority, making them 
less valid. This complex of  pluralistic ignorance led them to remain silent. Deontic concerns may have 
also had an effect on these people, and perhaps explain why those who recognised the injustice and 
malignity of  the system, did not say anything or oppose the regime. Authoritative norms did not 
permit open dissent, and through discipline, fear and hopelessness, these citizens of  the Third Reich 
remained silent.  
	 Furthermore, one might argue that, in using fomenting rhetoric and propaganda, Hitler was 
able to manipulate or bypass the Theory of  Mind of  most Germans, so that they would not feel 
empathy towards the Jews they were watching disappear, forcing into concentration camps or 
murdering. This was achieved, for example, by dehumanising the Jews and thereby creating a divide 
between Jewish and non-Jewish Germans, as sociologist Zygmunt Bauman explains in his work 
“Modernity and The Holocaust” (1989).  
	 In looking at history after the Nazi regime was toppled, we could analyse the reactions of  
Nazis, Nazi sympathisers and average citizens of  Germany to the atrocities committed during the 
Holocaust. In doing so we could look for evidence of  hindsight bias in statements from Germans, 
where citizens claim that they were never in support of  Hitler, they always knew that Nazi activities 
were wrong or did not know anything at all about the horrors taking place around them. Such a 
statement would seem farfetched, but perhaps these people would genuinely believe the things they 
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claim, as due to hindsight bias they are unable to recollect the original beliefs of  their past selves and 
return to the mental state they were once in.  
We could even go beyond the Holocaust itself  and closer to the present context to further 
explore the concepts of  our hypothetical paper and add depth to our work. In moving forward in 
time, it makes sense that the angle taken in this part of  the proposed future project would be that of  
hindsight bias. The phenomenon of  the Holocaust poses a challenge to sociologists, who have been 
trying to understand how, in a civilised society, it was possible for a handful of  leaders, led by one 
man, to manipulate the masses to allow the extermination of  6 million Jews. One of  the possible 
views on that matter was postulated by Bauman, who sees the Holocaust as an inherent part of  
Modernity, something that could not have happened before in any other time in human history 
(Bauman, 1989). He also stresses the importance of  the processes leading up to the outburst of  anti-
Semitism that, together with the world political situation after the First World War and technological 
advancement of  the 20th century, made it possible for the Holocaust to happen. Therefore it can be 
argued that from the privileged perspective of  a post-WWII scholar looking at the matter in 
hindsight, it may be a natural result to say that it was bound to happen considering all the factors, 
and that ‘we should have seen it coming’.  
Of  course this is rather a ‘whirlwind’ rundown of  how this project could look. Extensive 
research and perusal of  literature would be necessary prior to and in the process of  constructing this 
project. We would need to reference to historians, sociologists and other academics in order to 
qualify the statements we make about the Holocaust, particularly in regards to history. However, 
having produced this very project on Theory of  Mind, we can affirm that we are equipped with the 
theoretical knowledge in regards to the cognitive and social psychology which would be necessary to 
make the proposed future project a reality. 
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5. Conclusion 
Interdisciplinarity and lateral thinking are the pillars of  education at Roskilde University, and as 
such we feel confident in concluding that our advocating for the creation of  an extended 
conceptualisation of  Theory of  Mind is a valuable perspective. In line with our problem definition 
we have argued in this paper for the inclusion of  several other related phenomena in an 
interconnected understanding of  Theory of  Mind, spanning the disciplines of  cognitive psychology, 
social psychology, neuropsychology, intragroup dynamics, evolutionary psychology, cognitive literary 
studies and philosophy of  mind.  Although we decided early on to focus on the dimensions of  
Subjectivity and Learning and Philosophy and Science, the inclusion of  Text and Sign and Culture 
and History in further research could be of  benefit – the analysis of  the “Friends” episode and 
questions of  the cultural implications of  ToM in for example in the chapter on deontic reasoning are 
testament to that. 
Not only can all of  the above fields be linked to the comparatively young field of  ToM 
research, but as we have laid out in our discussion, these fields show considerable overlap amongst 
themselves. In the postmodern age of  rapid technological and societal advance the human mind 
remains a fundamental and universal conundrum of  relevance for all of  humanity. It is fortunate 
then, that said technological and societal advance favours and indeed promotes the interdisciplinary 
collaboration we set out to encourage. 
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